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INTRODUCTION 
The literature on the role of the Chief Justice of the United States 
has been dominated by two stereotypes.  One, perpetuated by Chief 
Justices themselves and generally endorsed by other Justices, is that 
the Chief Justice occupies the role of “first among equals,” meaning 
that the powers of the Chief are largely formal, such as personifying 
the Court as an institution, as opposed to substantive, such as exercis-
ing disproportionate influence on colleagues.  The phrase “among 
equals” in the stereotype is designed to emphasize the fact that nine 
Justices participate in the Court’s decisions, that each of their votes is 
given equal weight, and that the central job tasks of the Chief—
hearing arguments, deciding cases, writing opinions—are no different 
from those of the other Justices.1
The other stereotype, which has emerged primarily from social 
science literature, is that the Chief Justice has special opportunities to 
exercise “leadership” on the Court.  This stereotype is connected to a 
theory of collective decision making in small groups.2  Although the 
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1 For references to this stereotype, see HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
206 (4th ed. 1980) (discussing the role of the Chief Justice as primus inter pares); WAL-
TER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 82 (1964) (noting that while the Jus-
tices are in theory “equal in authority,” the Chief Justice does have some distinct au-
thority not possessed by the other Justices); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of 
the United States:  Primus Inter Pares, 17 J. PUB. L. 20, 20 (1968) (“The Court is often re-
ferred to by the name of the man who occupies the center chair, implying that he puts 
his peculiar stamp on the Court’s work.”).  The stereotype is captured by Chief Justice 
Salmon P. Chase, who wrote that “the Chief Justice . . . is but one of eight judges, each 
of whom has the same powers as himself.  His judgment has no more weight, and his 
vote no more importance, than those of any of his brethren.  He presides, and a good 
deal of extra labor is thrown upon him.  That’s all.”  Letter from Salmon P. Chase to 
John D. Van Buren (Mar. 25, 1868), quoted in Mason, supra, at 22. 
2 See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 83 (“[T]here is an expectation that a titular leader 
will exert both task and social leadership . . . .”); David J. Danelski, The Influence of the 
Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 
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Supreme Court is surely a unique small group—its decisions have very 
great authority and typically need to be given public legal justifications 
that are scrutinized by specialist commentators—it nonetheless re-
sembles many other small groups in reaching its decisions collectively, 
through a deliberative process, and in following an established proce-
dure, with formalized elements that facilitate that process.  Moreover, 
the Chief Justice is, on most occasions, the “task leader” for the 
group’s collective decision making3:  Chiefs set the agenda for the ar-
gument and discussion of cases and preside over the deliberations 
that lead to the rendering of a decision.  In addition, Chiefs often 
control the assignment of opinions accompanying the Justices’ dispo-
sitions of cases.  This “task leadership” can be seen as equivalent to 
that of the chair of a committee. 
Some social science scholarship has suggested that the “task lead-
ership” functions of the Chief Justice also create opportunities for 
substantive leadership.4  Two functions have been singled out.  First, 
in the hands of strategically minded Chiefs, the “task leadership” func-
tion of scheduling oral arguments and subsequent conference discus-
sions can serve as a means of affecting the deliberative process for 
high-profile cases.  Second, the “task leadership” function enables 
Chiefs, when they are part of the majority for a particular case, to stra-
tegically assign the opinion in that case to themselves or another 
member of the majority in accordance with substantive agendas. 
486, 486-90 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 2d ed. 1989) (describing the Chief 
Justice’s outsize influence as leader of the small group); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Use of 
Power in the Supreme Court:  The Opinion Assignments of Earl Warren, 1953-1960, 19 J. PUB. 
L. 49, 51 (1970) (discussing the power of the Chief Justice to assign opinions and the 
effect this has on collective decision making). 
3 The distinction between “task” and “social” leadership in small groups originated 
in Robert F. Bales, Task Roles and Social Roles in Problem-Solving Groups, in READINGS IN 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 437, 441 (Eleanor E. Maccoby et al. eds., 3d ed. 1958) (detailing 
“the hypothesis of two complementary leaders”:  a task-specialist and a social-emotional 
specialist); see also Walter F. Murphy, Courts As Small Groups, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 
1567 (1966) (discussing how a task leader “seeks to complete the present task in the 
most effective and efficient manner,” while a social leader “seeks to provide the 
friendly atmosphere that eases cooperation”). 
4 See, e.g., Danelski, supra note 2, at 487 (discussing how the Chief Justice can sub-
stantively exert influence); Walter F. Murphy, Marshaling the Court:  Leadership, Bargain-
ing, and the Judicial Process, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 640, 642 (1962) (“[T]he task-social lead-
ership dichotomy can . . . put on a firmer empirical basis the common sense 
observation that a man who wishes to exert influence over his fellows can do so most 
effectively if he is both intellectually disciplined and tactful in interpersonal rela-
tions.”); Ulmer, supra note 2, at 56 (discussing the opportunities for active leadership 
by the Chief Justice). 
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The chief justiceship, in sum, brings with it a special seniority.  
The Chief personifies the Court in popular parlance.  He also is, for 
better or worse, the Court’s chief presiding officer.  When social scien-
tists speak of the Chief’s “task leadership,” they have these special sen-
iority functions in mind.  But there has been remarkably little discus-
sion of the origins of these functions.  Why did the agenda-setting and 
assignment powers devolve upon the chief justiceship?  What is there 
about the office of Chief Justice that gives the occupant of that posi-
tion powers which transcend two long-established customs of the 
Court, that seniority yields privileges and that seniority is a function 
exclusively of a Justice’s length of service?  How, in short, did the spe-
cial seniority of the Chief Justice come into being? 
This Article explores these questions.  Part I considers why, as a 
historical matter, the chief justiceship was treated as a position distinct 
from that of the other justiceships, particularly since there was no dis-
cussion in the debates ratifying the Constitution of the Chief Justice’s 
office or powers, and only one constitutional provision singles out the 
chief justiceship, declaring that the Chief Justice will preside at presi-
dential impeachment trials.5  Part II explores the origins of the 
Chief’s powers of controlling the Court’s internal deliberations and of 
assigning opinions in cases, concluding, first, that neither one of those 
powers was historically inevitable; second, that the internal exercise of 
both powers has changed over the course of the Court’s history; and 
third, and perhaps most significantly, that the Court’s internal proto-
cols governing its deliberative process have also changed.  Finally, Part 
III asks to what extent the nineteenth-century legacy of the Chief Jus-
tice’s internal powers has served to burden, or benefit, some twenti-
eth- and twenty-first-century Chief Justices, and whether, notwithstand-
ing the historical contingency and changing exercise of those powers, 
they can now be said to be dimensions of the office of Chief Justice of 
the United States that are cast in stone. 
I.  THE ORIGINS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S SPECIAL SENIORITY 
A.  Early Assumptions About the Chief Justiceship 
Although the Constitution is virtually silent about the offices of 
the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the 
provision in Article I giving the Chief Justice power to preside over 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“When the President of the United States is tried [for 
impeachment], the Chief Justice shall preside . . . .”). 
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presidential impeachment trials can been seen as conveying some ex-
pectations about the position.  One was that a member of the federal 
judiciary would be an appropriate person to direct the trial of a Presi-
dent of the United States.  Not only was presiding over trials a core 
function of the office of judge, the judicial branch of the newly cre-
ated federal government was expected to be independent of the other 
branches. 
Another expectation was that the Chief Justice, by virtue of his po-
sition, was the nation’s primary legal authority.  It was necessary, in a 
trial determining whether the nation’s chief executive should remain 
in office, to have a person of nearly comparable status presiding.  The 
Chief Justice was the personification of the Court’s authority, more so 
than any of the Associate Justices.  He was, as it were, the Court’s 
commanding officer, whose status outranked that of his judicial col-
leagues. 
The idea that collegial courts (ones composed of multiple judges 
who made decisions collectively) would have “presiding” or “chief” 
judges had long been established in England at the time of the 
American Revolution, and was very likely imported into American le-
gal systems as a matter of course.  Collegial courts required some 
member to be responsible for organizing their proceedings and facili-
tating their deliberations; a chief judge performed that role.  With the 
assumption, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, that collegial courts 
would have presiding officers came the assumption that those officers 
would, by virtue of their organizational powers, hold a more senior 
status than their associates. 
One can see evidence of the special seniority of the Chief Justice 
from America’s earliest years.  During the tenure of John Jay (1789-
1795), the Court was composed of five or (after 1790) six Justices.  It 
decided comparatively few cases, and in most of those cases the Jus-
tices delivered and published opinions “seriatim,” or separately.  The 
order in which the seriatim opinions were published (and apparently 
delivered) was strictly by reverse seniority, with the most junior Justice 
(James Iredell or William Paterson) delivering his opinion first and 
Chief Justice Jay delivering his last.  In many instances Jay’s opinion 
was followed by a brief paragraph, with the heading “By the Court,” 
which announced the precise disposition of the case.  Occasionally an 
opinion would only consist of this “By the Court” paragraph; there 
would be no accompanying opinions.  In those instances, the Chief 
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Justice would deliver the “By the Court” opinion.6  On one occasion, 
after Jay had resigned from the Court and had been temporarily suc-
ceeded by John Rutledge,7 Rutledge delivered a “By the Court” opin-
ion in a case in which it was clear that he had not participated in the 
decision.8
During the tenure of Oliver Ellsworth (1796-1800) the Justices is-
sued seriatim opinions less frequently.  By this point practices had de-
veloped which clearly conveyed the special seniority of the Chief Jus-
tice.  On almost every occasion in which Ellsworth was present when 
an opinion of the Court was announced, he was recorded as having 
delivered that opinion.  When Ellsworth was not present (which was 
comparatively often, because he was ill for some of his tenure and was 
absent for nearly a year on a diplomatic mission), or did not partici-
pate in the decision, the Court’s reporter sometimes noted that in the 
Chief Justice’s absence another Justice was delivering the Court’s 
opinion.9  The assignment of that Justice seems to have been done on 
the basis of seniority. 
In addition, seriatim opinions on the Ellsworth Court tended to 
occur only in cases in which Ellsworth had not been present for the 
6 E.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 3 (1794); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794). 
7 After Jay resigned from the Court in June 1795, Rutledge was given a recess ap-
pointment by President Washington that July.  He presided over the Court for a brief 
Term in August 1795.  Rutledge subsequently made public his opposition to the Jay 
Treaty with France, which was extremely controversial.  The Senate then declined to 
confirm him to the chief justiceship in December 1795.  David J. Danelski, Ideology as a 
Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 900, 901-02 (1990).  Af-
ter offering the position to Patrick Henry, who declined, and to William Cushing, who 
chose to remain an Associate Justice, Washington appointed Oliver Ellsworth Chief 
Justice in March 1796.  David M. Levitan, The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court 
Justice, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 42 (1996). 
8 The Court’s minutes for August 12, 1795, indicate that Rutledge did not arrive in 
Philadelphia (where the Court sat) until late on that date and thus was not present for 
the first five days of argument in Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795), which 
were August 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12.  Rutledge did participate in arguments on August 13, 
14, 18, and 19.  1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789-1800, at 246-52 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985); 6 id. at 695 
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1998).  The opinions in Talbot included one by Rutledge.  3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) at 169. 
9 See Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 412 (1799) (describing a land dispute 
between the states of New York and Connecticut, where the reporter explained that 
Ellsworth, a resident of Connecticut, had recused himself).  For one of several exam-
ples in which Ellsworth was absent and no explanation was given, see Brown v. Van 
Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344, 356 (1797). 
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deliberations.10  By the close of Ellsworth’s tenure, the practice of sub-
stituting opinions of the Court for seriatim opinions was sufficiently 
established11—and sufficiently associated with the Chief Justice—that 
when the Justices reverted to seriatim opinions in the 1800 case of Bas 
v. Tingy, for which Ellsworth was absent, Justice Samuel Chase com-
mented on that fact.12
In the early Marshall Court, the practice of the Chief Justice deliv-
ering the opinion of the Court, even when he had not necessarily writ-
ten that opinion, continued.  In a survey of Marshall Court opinions 
from 1801 to 1810, Herbert Johnson found that in every instance from 
1801 to 1805 for which an opinion of the Court was announced, the 
reporter indicated that the Chief Justice had delivered the opinion or 
that, if the Chief Justice had not been present, the opinion had been 
delivered by the most senior Associate Justice.  After 1805, this prac-
tice was occasionally modified, but quite sparingly.13  Johnson’s find-
ings, and some additional evidence, led him to conclude that the Jus-
tice who delivered the opinion in this period of the Marshall Court 
was not necessarily the author of the opinion.14
10 E.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18 (1800).  I have found only one 
case, Fenemore v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 357, 363-64 (1797), in which Justices de-
livered seriatim opinions when Ellsworth was present. 
11 E.g., Clarke v. Russel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 415 (1799); Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 401 (1798); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). 
12 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (Chase, J.) (“The Judges agreeing unanimously in 
their opinion, I presumed that the sense of the Court would have been delivered by 
the president; and therefore, I have not prepared a formal argument on the occa-
sion.”). 
13 Johnson found that in the years from 1806 through 1808 only one opinion per 
Term did not reflect the seniority principle; in the 1809 and 1810 Terms four opinions 
each Term did not reflect it.  GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF POWER:  JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, pt. 2, at 386-87 (The Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 2, Paul A. 
Freund ed., 1981). 
14 For instance, when Chief Justice Marshall was absent from Court when the case 
of M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280 (1805), was delivered, Justice Cush-
ing, the most senior Associate Justice, delivered the opinion.  Johnson concluded that 
the quality of the opinion in M’Ilvaine was “well beyond [Cushing’s] capacities at that 
time, and perhaps beyond his professional ability even at a younger age.”  HASKINS & 
JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 384.  In addition, Marshall wrote a statement a year later in 
M’Ferran v. Taylor & Massie that indicated that he “did not . . . concur in the opinion 
which has been delivered,” and that he had “been directed to deliver” it.  7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 270, 282 (1806).  Marshall’s statement in M’Ferran, Johnson surmised, indi-
cated that “the Court as a group had arrived at its common judgment and [Marshall] 
was merely performing his duty as presiding officer in accordance with established cus-
tom and practice.”  HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 385. 
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Thus, from the earliest years of the Supreme Court, seniority 
played an important role in the Court’s proceedings, and the Chief 
Justice, regardless of the length of his tenure, was treated as the most 
senior of the Justices.  The order of reverse seniority in which seriatim 
opinions appeared, when coupled with the fact that cases in which the 
Justices issued separate opinions almost invariably concluded with a 
“By the Court” dispositional paragraph, suggests that seniority was 
treated as subtly increasing the weight of a seriatim opinion.  The 
practice of having the Chief Justice deliver the Court’s opinion in all 
cases where he was present, even though he may not have written the 
opinion, suggests that the office of Chief Justice was regarded as per-
sonifying the Court.  Even in years when the regular issuance of seria-
tim opinions might have underscored a perception that the Chief Jus-
tice was merely one member of a collegial Court, the special seniority 
of the chief justiceship was evident.  And when, in the later years of 
the Ellsworth Court15 and the Marshall Court, seriatim opinions re-
ceded and an “opinion of the Court” became the norm, the associa-
tion of the Court’s work with its Chief Justice became more pro-
nounced. 
B. The Chief Justiceship, the “Opinion of the Court” Practice,  
and Silent Acquiescence 
Although the special seniority of the chief justiceship was well es-
tablished by the time John Marshall became Chief Justice in 1801, it 
had largely been reflected in dimensions of the office that were more 
closely connected to Court protocol than to actual power.  Although 
the Chief Justice technically presided over arguments before the 
Court and its deliberations of cases, there is no direct evidence that 
the Chief Justices prior to Marshall sought to use their managerial 
powers in accordance with any substantive agendas.  The decline of 
seriatim opinions under Ellsworth may have been an effort on his part 
to exert more substantive influence, but no relevant data exist to test 
this hypothesis.  The practice of having the Chief Justice’s seriatim 
opinion appear just before the “By the Court” dispositional paragraph 
15 There is evidence that in the later years of his tenure Ellsworth was attempting 
to expand the “By the Court” dispositional paragraph into something resembling an 
“opinion of the Court.”  E.g., Sims’ Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 456 (1799); 
Clarke v. Russel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 415, 424 (1799); Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 
366-67 (1797).  In these cases, the opinions were introduced by variations of the state-
ment, “the opinion of the Court was delivered by the Chief Justice.”  My thanks to 
Natalie Wexler for calling these examples to my attention. 
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may have subtly strengthened the effect of that opinion, and the 
Chief’s habitual delivery of Court opinions, whether or not he had 
written them, may have served to identify the Chief more closely with 
the Court than other Justices.  But those functions were largely cere-
monial.  Under Marshall, however, the relationship between separate 
opinions by Justices and the opinion of the Court was altered, and the 
result was a significant increase in the internal powers of the Chief 
Justice. 
Five years into Marshall’s tenure, a close observer of the Court 
would have noticed that tendencies which had appeared during Ells-
worth’s chief justiceship had evolved into established practices.  The 
“By the Court” dispositional paragraphs, invariably unsigned but asso-
ciated with the Chief Justice under Ellsworth, had now come to be 
identified as “opinions of the Court.”  They were no longer merely 
summary resolutions of the issues under dispute in a case; they were 
full-blown opinions.  Moreover, the practice of having the Chief Jus-
tice deliver the opinion in every case when he was present had re-
sulted in Marshall’s name being identified with some quite lengthy 
“opinions of the Court.”  Finally, seriatim opinions had virtually dis-
appeared; indeed any opinions by Justices other than the Justice asso-
ciated with the “opinion of the Court” were rare. 
Those developments partially concealed a major change in the 
Court’s deliberations that Marshall, very likely with the support of Jus-
tice Bushrod Washington, had instituted.  Although the protocol by 
which the senior Justice (typically the Chief, since Marshall missed 
very few Court sessions in the first decade of his tenure) delivered the 
“opinion of the Court” was a holdover from Ellsworth’s chief justice-
ship, the elimination of seriatim opinions and the lengthening of the 
“By the Court” paragraphs into more extensive “opinions of the 
Court,” were innovations.  But the significance of these changes was 
enhanced by another change that only the closest observers of the 
Court might have noticed.  “Opinions of the Court” rarely revealed 
whether they represented the views of all the Justices or only a bare 
majority.16  Indeed, in some instances the opinions were not unani-
16 For some instances in which opinions did reveal the status of the opinion of the 
Court, see Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 94 (1823) (“The above is the opinion 
of a majority of the Court.”); The Frances & Eliza, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 398, 406 (1823) 
(“It is the unanimous opinion of the Court . . . .”). 
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mous:  Justices who had voted against the majority’s disposition—the 
“dissenters”—had “silently acquiesced” in the Court’s opinion.17
In addition, the “opinion of the Court,” which had been written 
by one Justice, had not been circulated among the Justices prior to be-
ing published.  Neither the other Justices who had voted for the ma-
jority disposition of a case nor those who had opposed that disposition 
would have had an opportunity to review a case after voting on its out-
come.  The only people who would have access to the opinions of the 
Court accompanying dispositions of cases were the author of those 
opinions and the Court’s reporter.  The legal justifications advanced 
in Marshall Court opinions were thus typically the product of only one 
Justice. 
A feature of the Marshall Court, even after its docket became 
more crowded and the cases it decided more momentous, was the very 
short time interval between the completion of oral arguments and the 
handing down of opinions.  In a number of celebrated cases the Court 
rendered opinions in five or fewer days following the completion of 
an oral argument.18  This statistic has astonished modern commenta-
tors on the Court’s business.  It becomes more readily explicable when 
one introduces some distinctive features of the Marshall Court’s work-
ing life, such as its practice of allowing counsel unlimited time for 
their arguments; the fact that Justices infrequently interrupted coun-
sel and often took extensive notes during the arguments; and the fact 
that Justices repaired, after the completion of a day of arguments, to a 
boardinghouse where they all resided and where, as Justice Joseph 
Story put it, they “moot[ed] every question as [they] proceed[ed]” 
with their social intercourse.19  Apparently, the Marshall Court Justices 
17 For evidence of the practice of silent acquiescence, see Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. 
(12 Wheat.) 370, 379 (1827) (Washington, J., dissenting) (“It has never been my habit 
to deliver dissenting opinions where it has been my misfortune to differ from those 
which have been pronounced by a majority of this Court.”); Bank of the United States 
v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (“I should 
now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ from this Court, acquiesce 
silently in its opinion . . . .”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 455 (1815) (Story, 
J., dissenting) (“Had this been an ordinary case I should have contented myself with 
silence; but . . . I have thought it not unfit to pronounce my own opinion . . . .”). 
18 See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, 
at 181 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, vols. 3-4, Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988) (“Of sixty-six con-
stitutional cases decided with full opinions between 1815 and 1835, the Marshall Court 
decided seventeen no more than five days after the conclusion of the argument.”). 
19 Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay (Feb. 24, 1812), in 1 LIFE AND LET-
TERS OF JOSEPH STORY 215, 215 (William W. Story ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & 
James Brown 1851). 
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did not regard themselves as precluded from discussing cases whose 
oral arguments were still in process, and those discussions may well 
have facilitated their eventual dispositions of the cases.  Moreover, 
when the Court made public its dispositions of cases, having formally 
noted them in its docket book (now known as the Court’s journal), 
the Justice who announced the Court’s result (typically Marshall) was 
not expected to provide an extended justification for it.  The United 
States Reports containing the Court’s opinions were typically published 
several months after the Court adjourned its yearly Term, which dur-
ing Marshall’s tenure consisted only of six to eight weeks.20
Nonetheless, the text of several major Marshall Court opinions 
appeared in early nineteenth-century newspapers,21 and comparisons 
between the newspaper versions (which often occupied several pages) 
and the official versions suggest that few changes were introduced.  
Moreover, contemporary observers reported that on occasion, when 
the Court handed down a decision, Marshall would begin reading 
from what appeared to be the opinion accompanying it.22  In short, on 
many occasions when Marshall “delivered” the opinion of the Court, 
he had already written that opinion himself.  In fact, because of the delays 
accompanying publication of the United States Reports, the amenability 
of some newspapers to publishing even lengthy opinions, and the in-
terest on the part of Justices in having their decisions communicated 
as widely as possible, it seems likely that on many occasions Marshall, 
after having satisfied himself that he would be with the majority in the 
disposition of a case, assigned himself the opinion and proceeded to 
draft it while the Court’s session in Washington was still going on. 
Marshall could do this with impunity, if the practices he had in-
troduced to the Court remained established, because he could expect 
that there would be no need for him to circulate a draft opinion to his 
colleagues and that there would be no published dissents from those 
20 See CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 293-318 (The Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 5, Paul 
A. Freund ed., 1974) (summarizing the job descriptions, including publication of opin-
ions, of the Court clerk and Court reporter); WHITE, supra note 18, at 183, 384-92 (de-
scribing the duties of the Court reporter and the tenures of Court Reporters Henry 
Wheaton and Richard Peters). 
21 See WHITE, supra note 18, at 928 (explaining that a few newspapers and journals 
“treated periodic reports on the official business of governmental institutions as part of 
their function,” and thus reported the Court’s opinions). 
22 See, e.g., Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason (Feb. 4, 1819), in 16 
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 43, 43 (1903) (describing Marshall’s 
deliverance of the opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518 (1819)). 
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Justices who had silently acquiesced in a case’s disposition.  The con-
tent of an opinion was a matter only for himself and the Court’s re-
porter.  Thus it seems fair to surmise that, on many occasions, the day 
on which the Marshall Court “handed down” a decision was the day on 
which John Marshall had completed a draft opinion in that case. 
In 1822, Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to William Johnson, 
whom he had appointed to the Court in 1805, complaining, among 
other things, about the practice of silent acquiescence on the Court.  
Under the practice, Jefferson maintained, “nobody” in the outside 
public “knows what opinion any individual member gave in any case, 
nor even that he who delivers the opinion, concurred in it himself.”23  
Johnson wrote back that when he had first come on the Court he 
found that Marshall had been “delivering all the opinions in cases in 
which he sat, even in some instances when contrary to his own judg-
ment and vote. . . . [When I protested against this], the answer was 
[that] he is willing to take the trouble and [that the practice] is a 
mark of respect to him.”24  Johnson then said that eventually he had 
persuaded his colleagues “to adopt the course they now pursue, which 
is to appoint someone to deliver the opinion of the majority, but leave 
it to the discretion of the rest of the judges to record their opinions or 
not ad libitum.”25
The letter confirms that the seniority protocol was controlling the 
delivery of Court opinions in the early years of Marshall’s tenure, and 
that it served on occasion to conceal the actual authorship of the 
opinions.  The letter also indicates that once the protocol of having 
the Chief Justice deliver the opinions in all cases was relaxed, there 
was no comparable protocol for the assignment of opinions, assuming 
that the Justice who “deliver[ed] the opinion of the majority” actually 
wrote that opinion.26  The change Johnson helped institute only gave 
Justices who differed from the majority “the discretion . . . to record 
23 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822) [hereinafter 
Jefferson Letter], in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1816-1826, at 222, 225 
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1899). 
24 Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822) [hereinafter 
Johnson Letter], quoted in DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON:  THE FIRST 
DISSENTER:  THE CAREER AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF A JEFFERSONIAN JUDGE 
181-82 (1954).  The handwritten letter is in the Jefferson Collection at the Library of 
Congress, available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mtj:6:./temp/~ammem_ax5p::.  
Morgan was the first of several scholars to make extensive use of this exchange be-
tween Jefferson and Johnson. 
25 Johnson Letter, supra note 24. 
26 Id. 
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their opinions or not.”27  When one examines the frequency of con-
curring and dissenting opinions on the Marshall Court in light of 
Johnson’s letter, it appears that few Justices took the opportunity to 
depart from the practice of silent acquiescence by making their oppo-
sition public. 
Johnson’s letter to Jefferson also provides an explanation for the 
practice itself.  “Some case soon occurred” after his appointment, 
Johnson wrote, 
in which I differed from my brethren, and I thought it a thing of course 
to deliver my opinion.  But, during the rest of the session I heard noth-
ing but lectures on the indecency of judges cutting at each other, and 
the loss of reputation which the Virginia appellate court had sustained 
by pursuing such a course.  At length I found that I must either submit 
to circumstances or become such a cypher in our consultations as to ef-
fect no good at all.  I therefore bent to the current, and persevered until 
I got them to adopt [my proposed change].
28
The Justices on the Court at the time Johnson joined it were, in 
order of seniority, Marshall, William Cushing, Samuel Chase, William 
Paterson, and Bushrod Washington.  Of those, only Marshall and 
Washington, both of whom had practiced in Virginia, would have 
been intimately familiar with “the Virginia appellate court,” so it 
seems likely that they were the source of the “lectures.”  But the prac-
tice that Johnson confronted did not only consist of an opinion of the 
Court with no concurrences or dissents; it involved Marshall’s deliver-
ing all the Court’s opinions, even when they were “contrary to his own 
judgment and vote.”  And although Johnson reported that this prac-
tice was explained as a gesture of respect to Marshall, he soon “found 
out,” he told Jefferson, “the real cause.” 29
The “real cause” of silent acquiescence, Johnson believed, was that 
it served to shield Justices who were unwilling or incapable of writing 
opinions on a regular basis.  Jefferson had suggested that “[t]he prac-
tice is certainly convenient for the lazy, the modest & the incompe-
tent,” for it “saves them the trouble of developing their opinion me-
thodically and even of making up an opinion at all.”30  Johnson 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Jefferson Letter, supra note 23, at 225.  Jefferson had previously expressed this 
view of the silent acquiescence practice to others.  For instance, in 1820, he wrote fel-
low Court critic Thomas Ritchie that “[a]n opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps 
by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy 
or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law to his mind, by the 
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pointedly confirmed this.  He discovered on coming to the Court in 
1805 that “Cushing was incompetent,” that “Chase could not be got to 
think or write,” that Paterson “was a slow man and willingly declined 
the trouble,” and that “the other two judges you know are commonly 
estimated as one judge.”31
Although Johnson indicated that by 1822 the protocol of Mar-
shall’s delivering the opinions in all cases had been abandoned, the 
number of concurring and dissenting opinions remained very low.  
Beginning in the 1823 Term, however, Johnson began to write sepa-
rate opinions, particularly in constitutional cases.  In an 1824 opinion 
he announced that “in questions of great importance and great deli-
cacy, I feel my duty to the public best discharged, by an effort to main-
tain my opinions in my own way,”32 and between that year and 1833, 
when he left the Court, he produced nine concurring and eighteen 
dissenting opinions.33  Most of Johnson’s associates declined to join 
him in that practice:  Marshall, Washington, Thomas Todd, Gabriel 
Duvall, Joseph Story, and Smith Thompson produced a grand total of 
ten dissents and no concurrences between 1824 and 1833.34  Some of 
the newer appointees in the later years of Johnson’s tenure, however, 
wrote separately more often, particular Henry Baldwin and John 
McLean, who published fifteen dissents and two concurrences be-
tween them from 1830 through 1833.35
The “opinion of the Court” and silent acquiescence practices un-
derscored the special seniority of the Chief Justice.  His opportunity to 
deliver the Court’s opinions had been a function of seniority; the op-
portunity to change the Court’s opinion-writing customs from seriatim 
opinions to an opinion of the Court can also be seen as related to the 
prerogatives of his office.  Even Chiefs operating at times in which se-
riatim opinions had been the norm had garnered some slight advan-
tages from the order in which those opinions were published, and 
Ellsworth had apparently converted these advantages into a process 
that deemphasized seriatim opinions and emphasized the “By the 
Court” paragraphs, which he typically delivered. 
turn of his own reasoning.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 
1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 23, at 169, 171. 
31 Johnson Letter, supra note 24. 
32 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 223 (1824) ( Johnson, J., concurring). 
33 See MORGAN, supra note 24, app. II at 306-07 (tabulating the opinions of each 
Justice during this time period). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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So Marshall had profited from the special seniority of his prede-
cessor Chiefs.  But he had gone much further.  He had, in effect, gar-
nered for himself the opportunity to write every opinion for the Court 
in which he was in the majority, and to ensure that dissenters from 
that opinion would keep silent.  He was the first Chief Justice deci-
sively to convert protocol seniority into internal power. 
C.  The Assignment Power of the Chief Justice:  Early Practice 
It may be assumed that part of the reason Marshall was able to 
write, as well as to deliver, so many opinions in the early years of his 
tenure was that the current assignment power of the Chief Justice was 
in place.  That assumption cannot be confirmed.  The current as-
signment power of the Chief Justice exists in a context in which cases 
set for disposition by the Court’s conference are discussed in a regular 
order, based on seniority, and in which the Chief Justice is expected 
to assign opinions when he is with the majority and the most senior 
associate Justice with the majority to assume that role when the Chief 
opposes the majority’s disposition.  Moreover, the assignment of opin-
ions has for some time been handled in accordance with a principle 
of roughly equal distribution of opinions among the Justices. 
There is no indication that this procedure was followed on the 
Marshall Court.  As noted, no formal conference took place among 
the Marshall Court Justices; they simply “mooted” cases as they “pro-
ceeded” to discuss them informally in the boardinghouse while the 
cases were being argued.  There is no evidence that those discussions 
were conducted according to any formal procedure, although Mar-
shall was surely the nominal chair of them.  And there is nothing to 
suggest that Marshall made an effort, once votes on cases had been 
taken, to assign opinions on an equal basis.  To the contrary, there is 
substantial evidence that Marshall took on most of the opinions him-
self.  In a thirty-four-year tenure Marshall wrote 547 opinions.  Duvall 
was on the Court for twenty-three of those years; he produced fifteen 
opinions.  Todd, who overlapped with Marshall for eighteen years, 
produced fourteen.36  In the years between 1816 and 1823, when the 
Court issued a very high percentage of opinions without any recorded 
36 WHITE, supra note 18, at 191 (using the notations in volumes 1 Cranch through 
9 Pet. (5 to 34 U.S.)); see also Robert G. Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins of Supreme 
Court Leadership, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 785, 800 tbl.1 (1975) (comparing Marshall’s num-
bers to all other Justices during his tenure). 
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concurrences or dissents,37 Marshall wrote for the Court 124 times, 
Story 66 times, Johnson 47 times, and all the other Justices combined 
only 65 times.38
Although Chief Justice Roger Taney was apparently less inclined 
than Marshall to write a large percentage of the Court’s opinions,39 
there is no authoritative evidence that during Taney’s tenure the 
Court’s current assignment practice had come into being.40  What evi-
dence there is suggests a more informal process.  The Dred Scott case41 
may have been atypical, but there the Justices apparently canvassed in-
formally on its issues, then came to an initial disposition, supported by 
five Justices, that Dred Scott was a citizen of the United States, and 
thus eligible to bring suit in federal court, but was at the same time a 
slave under Missouri law.42  The opinion in the case was assigned to 
Justice Samuel Nelson, a member of the majority, with Taney and Jus-
37 In the 302 opinions rendered by the Court in this period, there were only 
twenty-four dissents and eight concurrences.  WHITE, supra note 18, at 184 (using the 
notations in volumes 1 through 8 Wheat. (14 to 21 U.S.)). 
38 Id. 
39 In commemorative remarks after Taney’s death in 1864, former Justice Benja-
min R. Curtis said that Taney was “aware that many of his associates were ambitious of 
[writing opinions],” and that “these considerations often influenced him to request 
others to prepare opinions which he could and otherwise would have written.”  Ben-
jamin Robbins Curtis, Character and Public Services of Chief Justice Taney, Remarks 
Made at a Meeting of the Boston Bar (Oct. 15, 1864), in 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROB-
BINS CURTIS 336, 341 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1879).  A 
study of Chief Justices’ “self-assignment” of majority opinions in “salient” cases found 
that Marshall had the power to assign nineteen of twenty-one salient cases, and gave 
seventeen to himself, while Taney was only able to assign twelve of eighteen such cases, 
and gave only five to himself.  Saul Brenner, The Chief Justices’ Self Assignment of Majority 
Opinions in Salient Cases, 30 SOC. SCI. J. 143, 146 (1993).  By “salient cases,” Brenner 
meant decisions, mainly but not exclusively involving constitutional law issues, that Su-
preme Court scholars have subsequently considered important.  Id. at 145. 
40 Charles Fairman states that during the Chase Court “[t]he writing of opinions 
was assigned by the Chief Justice—save that if he were dissenting, the senior Justice in 
the majority would select the one to write.”  CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REUNION, 1864-88, PART ONE, at 66 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 6, Paul A. Freund ed., 1971) [hereinafter 
FAIRMAN, PART ONE].  Fairman points to Chase’s diary entry for support:  “Field inti-
mated that Miller was displeased with my assignment of cases . . . .”  Id. at 66 n.129 (cit-
ing Salmon P. Chase, Diary Entry ( Jan. 7, 1866) [hereinafter Chase Diary Entry]). 
 Although Fairman states that the assignment practice had been in place for many 
years, his evidence does not necessarily indicate that it was in place on the Chase 
Court.  Chase’s diary only indicates that he was assigning cases, not that he was doing 
so only when he voted with the majority. 
41 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
42 SWISHER, supra note 20, at 615-19. 
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tices James Wayne, Peter Daniel, and Benjamin Curtis insisting that 
the question of Scott’s citizenship needed first to be decided.43
Had current assignment practice been followed, the assignment of 
the opinion to Nelson would have been made by Justice John McLean, 
the senior Justice in the majority.44  But McLean was one of two Jus-
tices who subsequently declared his intention of going beyond Nel-
son’s opinion to reach issues such as the citizenship of blacks and the 
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.45  It seems odd that 
McLean would have assigned the opinion to Nelson, who persisted in 
his narrow disposition of the case, if he believed that the Court should 
take up issues that Nelson’s opinion avoided.46  The Court’s subse-
quent decision to abandon Nelson’s opinion, and to address those is-
sues, was precipitated by a motion made by Wayne.  At that point the 
Justices apparently recanvassed their views,47 resulting in seven Justices 
concluding that Scott lost the case either because he was not a citizen 
of the United States or because he could not have become free on en-
tering Illinois Territory, since the Missouri Compromise, under which 
the federal government outlawed slavery in some federal territories, 
was unconstitutional.48
After that recanvass, all the Justices resolved to file opinions, and 
Taney’s opinion was identified as the opinion of the Court.49  Since 
Taney was now with the majority in its disposition of the case, he 
might have assigned the opinion of the Court to himself, but the fact 
that all Justices were expected to write separately suggested that 
Taney’s “opinion” might not eventually command a majority in its rea-
soning.  In the end, only Wayne’s opinion explicitly supported 
Taney’s.  Grier concurred with Taney only in finding the Missouri 
Compromise unconstitutional; Daniel, Campbell, and Catron also 
agreed in that result, but for separate reasons; Nelson’s opinion con-
43 Id. at 619. 
44 The Dred Scott case was handed down in 1857.  McLean was appointed to the 
Court in 1830.  The other members of the majority were Justices John Catron, ap-
pointed in 1837; Nelson, appointed in 1845; Robert Grier, appointed in 1846; and 
John Campbell, appointed in 1853. 
45 SWISHER, supra note 20, at 617.  Justice Catron, in a letter to President-elect 
James Buchanan, did not identify the two Justices, but Swisher states that they were 
“probably known to Buchanan as McLean and Curtis.”  Id. (citing Letter from John 
Catron to James Buchanan (Feb. 19, 1857)). 
46 Nelson’s published opinion in the Dred Scott case was identical to the one he had 
written as the “opinion of the Court” prior to its being abandoned.  Id. at 625-26. 
47 Id. at 619. 
48 For a summary of the opinions, see id. at 622-29. 
49 Id. at 619. 
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tinued to maintain his narrow view of the case; and McLean and Cur-
tis dissented, disagreeing with Taney on both the status of Scott’s citi-
zenship and the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. After 
the opinions appeared, it was hard to know what the the collective ba-
sis of the Dred Scott opinion was.50
The Dred Scott case, in its aftermath, also illustrated that the prac-
tice of one Justice preparing an opinion of the Court, not circulating 
it before delivery, and then dispatching it to the Court’s reporter for 
eventual publication, was still extant in the late years of Taney’s ten-
ure.  In 1841, Taney wrote a letter to Court Reporter Richard Peters in 
which he said that “[a] fashion has lately grown up, to examine after 
Term, opinions delivered in court, and to write answers to them to be 
published in the reports.”51  Taney disapproved of the practice, al-
though he admitted that once an opinion had been filed with the 
clerk (an 1835 rule of the Court had made such filing mandatory, but 
only for opinions of the Court52), any Justice was entitled to a copy.53  
He told Peters that he did not intend to make his separate opinions 
generally available, and that he would hold them until the very last 
minute before giving them to Peters for immediate publication.54  The 
letter confirms that on the Taney Court not only were opinions not 
circulated prior to their being delivered, they were not circulated at 
all in most instances.  There also seems to have been an expectation 
that once an opinion of the Court was read by its author in confer-
ence or in Court, significant changes would not be made to it before 
publication.55
50 Two contemporary reviews of the Dred Scott decision, one in the North American 
Review and the other in the Law Reporter, emphasized the differences among the major-
ity Justices and suggested that the Taney opinion could not fairly be characterized as 
an “opinion of the Court.”  Timothy Farrar, The Dred Scott Case, 85 N. AM. REV. 392 
(1857); Horace Gray & John Lowell, The Case of Dred Scott, 20 LAW REP. 61 (1857).  
Both reviews are cited, and their authors identified (the reviews were both anony-
mous), in SWISHER, supra note 20, at 642-43. 
51 Letter from Roger B. Taney to Richard Peters (Mar. 22, 1841), quoted in 
SWISHER, supra note 20, at 302. 
52 The Court’s rule stated:  “All opinions delivered by the court shall immediately, 
upon the delivery thereof, be delivered over to the clerk to be recorded.”  FAIRMAN, 
PART ONE, supra note 40, at 70 (quoting Supreme Court Rule 25).  An opinion was 
“delivered by the court” “[w]hen a justice had read the opinion, in full or in summary, 
from the bench.”  Id. 
53 SWISHER, supra note 20, at 302. 
54 Id. 
55 Cf. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 515-16 (1849) (Daniels, J., dis-
senting) (deploring the significant changes made to the opinion of the Court after it 
had “been propounded from the bench”). 
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Taney seems to have assumed that this would be the practice with 
Dred Scott, and he was highly offended when Curtis published his dis-
senting opinion in that case in a Boston newspaper shortly after the 
decision was handed down.56  In his opinion Curtis had included evi-
dence from the framing period that suggested that several states had 
treated persons of African descent as citizens.57  In response to that 
evidence, Taney intended to revise his Dred Scott opinion and did not 
release it to the Court reporter.58  When Curtis learned that Taney was 
revising his opinion, he wrote the clerk of the Court asking that his 
opinion not be printed and for a copy of Taney’s.59  The clerk re-
sponded that Taney had issued a written order on April 6, a month 
after the Justices had delivered their Dred Scott opinions, that no one 
should be given access to his opinion.60
Curtis found it hard to believe that Taney’s order applied to a 
member of the Court, so he wrote the clerk again, and when informed 
that it did, wrote Taney.61  This began a correspondence, from April 
to June 1857, in which Taney intimated that Curtis, who had allowed 
his opinion to be published in a newspaper, wanted Taney’s opinion 
for political purposes, and Curtis cited the rule requiring that opin-
ions of the Court be filed with the clerk.62  The incident contributed 
to Curtis’s decision to resign from the Court that September.63  It in-
dicates that on the Taney Court, at least, there was still a strong em-
bargo against public disputes among Justices in the form of exchanges 
in opinions.  Even though Taney was well aware that Dred Scott was an 
exceptional case in the number of opinions it stimulated and the dif-
ferences among the Justices revealed in these opinions, he insisted 
that the tradition of the Court not to circulate opinions once they had 
been delivered, and not to revise them significantly after colleagues 
had had an opportunity to hear them, should be maintained.  He felt 
that Curtis had breached that protocol by releasing his opinion to a 
56 See SWISHER, supra note 20, at 632-33 (describing the exchange between Taney 
and Curtis following the publication of Curtis’s dissent). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 632-33. 
59 Id. at 633 (citing Letter from Benjamin R. Curtis to William T. Carroll (Mar. 14, 
1857)). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 634. 
62 Id.  The correspondence is set forth in 1 Curtis, supra note 39, at 211-30. 
63 See SWISHER, supra note 20, at 636-37 (explaining how Curtis’s strained relation-
ship with Taney, and the public’s association of Curtis with the abolitionist cause that 
resulted from his opinion in Dred Scott, contributed to his decision to resign). 
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newspaper and then making efforts to revise that opinion—and refute 
some of Taney’s revisions—before official publication. 
The Dred Scott evidence about the circulation and revision of opin-
ions does not, of course, say anything directly about the process by 
which the Taney Court reached decisions or assigned opinions.  But it 
suggests that the informal norms of the Marshall Court were still very 
much in place.  Justices were not expected to snipe at one another in 
public by writing concurring and dissenting opinions directed at the 
language of opinions of the Court.  The norm of silent acquiescence 
had been a technique by which Justices suppressed their differences, 
conveying the impression that the Court was a unified body.  An un-
derstood corollary to silent acquiescence was that once a Justice pro-
duced an opinion of the Court, and read it to his colleagues, they 
would not fuss publicly about its language.  This corollary meant that 
being assigned an opinion was not as onerous a task as it would have 
been in a Court whose norms required the circulation of, and formal 
acquiescence in, draft opinions.  It meant that in most cases a Justice 
was only responsible for his vote. 
So one might infer, once the norms of noncirculation and silent 
acquiescence are assumed to remain in place, that if something like a 
regularized process of opinion assignments existed on the Taney 
Court, the Justices assigning opinions would be less inclined to feel a 
need to distribute assignments equally among their colleagues.  This 
was because writing an “opinion of the Court,” in a process in which 
others, having committed themselves to the results of that opinion, 
have no expectation of even seeing it, let alone signing on to its lan-
guage, can hardly be said to be an excessively burdensome task.  In-
deed, a process in which the only responsibility of the opinion writer 
is to prepare a set of justifications for the Court’s official reports 
would seem likely to sort out those Justices who liked writing opinions 
from those who did not.  If one assumes that there would invariably be 
Justices in the latter category, the process on the Taney Court, like 
that on the Marshall Court, would actually seem to precipitate the un-
equal distribution of opinions.  An assigning Chief, or an assigning Jus-
tice or group of Justices, would be inclined to give “opinions of the 
Court” to those who liked writing them.  Others could concentrate 
simply on making decisions. 
Before extending this survey of the Court’s internal deliberative 
practices further into the nineteenth century, it is worth pausing to 
consider a question that those practices inevitably raise for modern 
commentators.  The combination of the norm of silent acquiescence 
  
1482 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1463 
 
and the absence of circulation of “opinions of the Court” prior to 
their appearing in the United States Reports caused the jurisprudential 
status of those opinions, when considered from modern perspectives, 
often to be misleading.  Although a majority of Justices had typically 
endorsed the actual disposition of issues rendered by an “opinion of 
the Court,”64 only one had advanced the legal justifications for that 
disposition, and in most instances, at least through Taney’s tenure, 
none of the other Justices had seen, let alone subscribed to, those jus-
tifications.  The only persons who normally had access to an “opinion 
of the Court” as it evolved from draft status to official version in the 
United States Reports were the author of that opinion, the Court clerk, 
and the Court reporter.  The clerk, after 1835, was given a copy of the 
opinion after the Court’s disposition of a case was officially an-
nounced, but only for the purpose of keeping a record.  The reporter, 
especially during Henry Wheaton’s tenure,65 was regularly involved in 
the editing of draft opinions before they were published, but the only 
Justice he consulted in the editing process was the author of the 
draft.66
This meant that the reasoning of an opinion of the Court, so long 
as the practice of noncirculation of draft opinions remained in place, 
usually represented only the views of one Justice.  In a jurisprudential 
climate in which the Court’s majority opinions have come to be repre-
sented by their reasoning as much as by their results—the Court typi-
cally alludes to the reasoning of its precedents in following them, ex-
tending them, distinguishing them, or overruling them—learning that 
earlier opinions of the Court only represented the reasoning of one 
Justice may appear, to put it mildly, startling.  But here again one 
needs to guard against the anachronistic projection of current atti-
tudes onto the work of earlier Courts. 
64 Typically, but not invariably, as the Dred Scott case illustrates.  Although Taney’s 
opinion was designated the “opinion of the Court,” a close reading of all the opinions 
in Dred Scott reveals that only Justice Wayne endorsed it in full, and that although a ma-
jority of Justices agreed that the petitioner Scott had lost his case, they did not agree 
on the reasons.  SWISHER, supra note 20, at 625-28. 
65 Wheaton was the Court’s reporter from the 1816 through the 1827 Terms.  For 
illustrations of his editing of draft opinions of the Court, and how this influenced sev-
eral cases’ language and disposition, see WHITE, supra note 18, at 391-400. 
66 Wheaton and other reporters regularly consulted with the lawyers who had ar-
gued cases they reported, but this was for the purpose of assembling the summaries of 
arguments that were included in the Court’s official reports, which were elaborately 
presented through Wheaton’s tenure.  Wheaton’s successor, Richard Peters, reduced 
the argument summaries.  WHITE, supra note 18, at 407-08. 
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The nineteenth-century Court’s practices of silent acquiescence 
and noncirculation took place in a different jurisprudential universe 
from that which came to develop in the early years of the twentieth 
century.  A fundamental proposition of that universe was that judicial 
decisions were not the equivalent of positivistic enactments of law, 
such as the actions of legislatures, but rather mere evidence of legal 
principles.  Those principles—whether manifested in provisions of the 
Constitution, prior common law decisions of courts, local customs and 
practices, conventions of “civilized” nations, the “laws” of nature, or 
foundational values of free republican governments—transcended ju-
dicial decisions and existed apart from them.  “Law,” in America, was 
understood as being composed of both the positivistic enactments of 
legislatures and members of the federal and state executive branches, 
and those transcendent, immanent principles.  When a court made a 
decision, it was understood to be discerning legal principles and ap-
plying them to a dispute.  Its decision was taken as evidence of the ex-
istence and applicability of the principles thought to govern the case it 
decided.67
A corollary to the above proposition is that judicial decisions 
could erroneously apply principles to cases.  When a subsequent court, 
on reviewing such decisions as potential precedents, concluded that 
“demonstrable error” had occurred, no evidentiary weight was given 
to the decision.  It was not simply thought of as “bad law” and over-
ruled (although judicial overruling of “erroneous” precedents was not 
uncommon), but as “not law at all,” as evidence about the content or 
meaning of “law” that turned out to be faulty. 
This attitude toward the status of judicial decisions, so long as it 
persisted in American jurisprudence, produced what can be regarded, 
from a modern perspective, as a diminished status for judicial opin-
ions as precedents.  Since the content of a judicial opinion was not 
seen as the equivalent of law but only as evidence of law’s application 
to a particular case, the practice of stare decisis was qualified:  what-
67 For evidence of a multiplicity of early nineteenth-century sources supporting 
the generalizations made in this paragraph, see WHITE, supra note 18, at 111-56 (rank-
ing sources of law in early nineteenth-century jurisprudence and explaining attitudes 
toward them); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 4-5, 9-48 (2001) (describing arguments for decisions based on external sources 
of law and the belief that common law was derived from external sources).  For a pio-
neering treatment of some of those sources, see Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and 
Stare Decisis:  The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 33-34 (1959) (ar-
guing that some sources of law were thought of as external and superior to judicial de-
cisions). 
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ever presumption lay in favor of following established “case law” 
needed to be understood as capable of being overcome once that 
“case law” was determined to be demonstrably erroneous.  This did 
not mean that a freewheeling attitude toward existing judicial deci-
sions prevailed in nineteenth-century America.  Like their twentieth- 
and twenty-first-century counterparts, judges and commentators 
struggled to reconcile the force of settled expectations with a recogni-
tion that prior decisions had come to be seen as deeply flawed in some 
fashion.68  It did mean, however, that the reasoning in a judicial opin-
ion was understood simply as evidence of the applicability of a legal 
principle or principles to a case.  It was a “gloss” on the law, not the 
law itself.  One can see, in this context, how the stakes in opinion writ-
ing might have been perceived to have been lower, especially since the 
reasoning in an opinion of the Court would have been perceived as 
simply an effort to apply principles to cases rather than as a doctrinal 
roadmap for future cases.69
II.  CHANGES IN THE LATER NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The jurisprudential climate that helped foster the practices of si-
lent acquiescence and noncirculation does not appear to have been 
significantly modified for the balance of the nineteenth century, de-
spite major changes in the volume of the Court’s business and, even-
tually, in its internal protocols.  As the Civil War drew to a close, and 
Salmon P. Chase replaced Taney as Chief Justice, the Court’s docket 
dramatically increased, but some features of the Court’s internal 
process remained constant, the most notable being the noncirculation 
of opinions.  Even though the volume of Court business had suffi-
ciently increased by Chase’s tenure, such that cases would routinely 
not be argued for two or three years after being placed on the Court’s 
docket, the actual deliberation and disposition of cases remained 
summary.  Typically only a month elapsed between the time a case was 
68 Nelson, supra note 67, at 9-48, has an extended discussion of techniques early 
nineteenth-century courts and commentators used in their efforts to reconcile settled 
expectations with perceptions that prior decisions now seemed “demonstrably errone-
ous.”  Among those techniques was one based on the now-obscure theory that succes-
sive judicial interpretations of legal principles, even if not necessarily “correct,” could 
become “liquidated,” which in the early nineteenth century meant “fixed or estab-
lished.”  Id. at 10-22.  Although even “liquidated” interpretations could be abandoned 
as “demonstrably erroneous,” the idea of liquidation served to reinforce settled juris-
prudential expectations.  Id. 
69 I am indebted to Ted Ruger, who read an earlier draft of this Article, for his 
contributions to this last set of observations. 
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argued and the time a decision was handed down.  Cases were gener-
ally discussed, and voted on, in the Court’s Saturday conference fol-
lowing the week in which they had been argued.  Opinions were as-
signed after the voting, and the author of the “opinion of the Court” 
was expected to produce it in two or three weeks.  A prepared opinion 
was expected to be read to the other Justices in a Saturday conference, 
and then delivered in Court the following Monday.  It would then go 
to the clerk, and eventually to the reporter for publication.70
The increased number of cases brought to the Court—which re-
sulted, from 1869 on, in the Justices’ supplementing their regular 
“December Terms,” which began in early December and lasted ap-
proximately seventeen weeks, with an October “adjourned Term,” in 
which they took up to two months to complete work left over from the 
previous spring—had not resulted in a more extensive deliberation 
process.  Indeed a summary deliberative process was the only way in 
which the Court could have kept abreast of its docket.  Authors of 
opinions still did not circulate them, and concurrences and dissents 
remained rare.  The historian Charles Fairman, after describing the 
absence of circulated opinions, suggested that “the other Justices 
would generally have no opportunity to read the opinion and to re-
flect upon the drafting,” and that “[e]vidently there was not a very 
high sense of corporate responsibility.”71
A.  Agenda Setting 
The added workload on the Chase Court doubtless placed a heav-
ier burden on its Chief Justice to set the agenda for conferences and 
to move cases through the docket.  But Chase does not seem to have 
been particularly attentive to administrative details.  This may have 
been a function of his initial lack of interest in the work.  During his 
70 FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 69-70.  It is not clear when the practice 
began under which a Justice who had been assigned an “opinion of the Court” read 
that opinion (or perhaps portions of it) in conference.  It may have been a result of 
the Justices’ no longer living together in a boardinghouse:  during Taney’s tenure they 
began to occupy different houses in Washington, sometimes with their families.  See 
SWISHER, supra note 20, at 8-9, 837-39 (contrasting the early years of the Taney Court, 
when all the Justices were expected to live in the boardinghouse, with its later years, 
when some Justices had bought permanent houses in the District of Columbia and 
others lived in rented houses or hotels).  Swisher also notes that Justice Nelson, after 
initially being assigned the “opinion of the Court” in Dred Scott, read it to Justice 
Campbell in “his room,” but “not . . . at conference.”  SWISHER, supra note 20, at 619 
(citing Letter from John A. Campbell to George T. Curtis (Oct. 30, 1879)). 
71 FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 70. 
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first Term, in January 1865, he wrote a friend of “the painful monot-
ony of hearing, reading, thinking and writing on the same class of sub-
jects and in the same way, all the time—morning, noon, evening and 
night,”72 and noted in his diary that there had been “no event worth 
mentioning” in his time at the Court.73  At any rate, he misunderstood 
the terms of a conference discussion involving the Court’s resumption 
of appeals from southern states, which had been suspended during 
the Civil War, and announced, in February 1866, that lawyers could 
not participate in those cases unless they had satisfied the “test oath” 
requirements of congressional statutes, passed during the war, which 
conditioned the practice of law on a showing of loyalty to the Union.74  
On hearing Chase’s announcement, Justice David Davis said that it 
was not what he had understood the Court to have decided, and the 
next day Chase announced that attorneys could appear without proof 
of having taken an oath.75  At the same time he dissented from that 
order.76
The incident suggests that Chase was sometimes strikingly casual 
in his recollections of the Court’s deliberations and also inclined to 
draw conclusions that suited his purposes.  Another example comes 
from cases testing the constitutionality of the federal and state “test 
oaths” themselves, which the Court heard in March 1866.  The Court, 
finding itself deeply divided on the cases, postponed a decision on 
them until its December 1866 Term.  At the time of the postpone-
ment, it appeared that four Justices—James Wayne, Samuel Nelson, 
Robert Grier, and Nathan Clifford—were inclined to find the test 
oaths unconstitutional, and four others—Chase, Noah Swayne, Sam-
uel Miller, and Davis—were inclined to sustain them, with Stephen 
Field’s position being unclear (he would eventually find them uncon-
stitutional).77
72 Letter from Salmon P. Chase to “Dear friend” (Mar. 1865), quoted in JOHN 
NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE:  A BIOGRAPHY 376 (1995). 
73 Salmon P. Chase, Diary Entry (Jan. 20, 1865), quoted in NIVEN, supra note 72, at 
376. 
74 FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 136-37. 
75 Id. at 137. 
76 2 THE DIARY OF ORVILLE HICKMAN BROWNING 61-62 ( James G. Randall ed., 
1933).  Browning, who frequently argued cases before the Court, was counsel in two 
appeals from southern states and was present to hear Chase’s initial order, which was 
announced on February 13.  Davis’s reaction and Chase’s modification of the order, 
along with his dissent, were issued the next day.  FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 
136-37. 
77 THE DIARY OF ORVILLE HICKMAN BROWNING, supra note 76, at 67, 69-70; Letter 
from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger (July 31, 1866), quoted in CHARLES FAIR-
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In May, two members of Congress—Representative John Hogan 
and Senator Reverdy Johnson—were quoted as saying that the Court 
had decided that the test oaths were unconstitutional but had post-
poned an opinion until its next Term.78  Johnson, who frequently ar-
gued before the Court, wrote a colleague that although the Court had 
decided the test oath cases, “the failure to announce the decision 
was . . . mainly owing to the fact that the Judge selected to deliver the 
opinion had not time before the close of the term to prepare such a 
one as the importance and gravity of the question required”; the letter 
was published in the National Intelligencer on June 1.79  On June 5, Jus-
tice Miller, having seen the letter, wrote Chase that Johnson’s state-
ment was false, and since the test oath was a major political issue in 
Missouri, perhaps someone from the Court should clarify the matter.80  
Before the cases had been postponed, Justice Field had moved that 
the Court only decide the Missouri case and postpone the federal 
cases.  This motion had been strenuously opposed by Miller, and 
eventually Grier moved that the Court postpone decision on all of the 
cases.  Miller suggested to Chase that he saw “no wrong, but a manifest 
propriety in contradicting the assertion that the Court has decided an 
important case . . . when it has done no such thing.”81
Chase’s reply indicated that he had “no memoranda of what took 
place” in the Court’s conference on the test oath cases.82  Further-
more, he had no memory of the merits of Missouri cases being dis-
cussed at all, although he remembered an extensive discussion of the 
congressional test oath, Field’s motion to separate the federal cases 
from the Missouri cases and decide the latter, Miller’s “strong appeal” 
resisting that, and Grier’s eventual motion to postpone all of the 
cases.83  But Chase suggested there might have been a “caucus or con-
ference” by some Justices “separate” from others, which he “kn[e]w 
MAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 130-31 (1939) 
[hereinafter FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER]. 
78 Hogan said in a speech in St. Louis on May 1, 1866, that “the Supreme Court 
has decided that the oath of Missouri is an unconsitutional oath,” but that he did not 
know the information “from any written opinion which they have published.”  MO. RE-
PUBLICAN, May 2, 1866, quoted in FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 152. 
79 Johnson wrote the letter on May 30, 1866, to Hogan, who arranged for its publi-
cation in the National Intelligencer.  FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 152-53. 
80 Letter from Samuel F. Miller to Salmon P. Chase ( June 5, 1866) [hereinafter 
Miller-Chase Letter], quoted in FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 153-54. 
81 Id. 
82 Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Samuel F. Miller ( June 9, 1866) [hereinafter 
Chase-Miller Letter I], quoted in FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 154-56. 
83 Id. 
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nothing of.”84  He would “be sorry to believe there was any such pri-
vate arrangement or understanding.”85
Chase’s letter suggests that not only did he not keep records of 
what transpired in conference, he did not always recall what had taken 
place.  Miller’s “memory [was] so much more accurate than mine,” he 
said, and he would be glad to get “an exact account of what did actu-
ally transpire.”86  Indeed, Miller told Davis that Miller “sent Chase at 
[Chase’s] request memoranda from my note book in which I have a 
full statement of the [Court’s deliberations on the test oath cases] 
noted down at the time.”87  Chase also encouraged Miller to make a 
public statement that the cases had not been decided.88
Miller, and Davis, did tell confidants that the cases had simply 
been postponed, and an article in a Missouri newspaper reported that 
fact on June 22, 1866.89  Around the same time, Justice Field, then in 
San Francisco, heard about Johnson’s letter and sent a telegram to 
Chase asking whether the letter “required any notice from Judge[s].”90  
On July 3, Chase wrote again to Miller, repeating that Johnson’s letter 
was clearly inaccurate “unless there was, what I will not believe, a se-
cret arrangement among five of the Judges that the Congress-
Attorney-oath cases should be postponed and that the Missouri oath 
case should be decided against the oath without any opportunity for 
prior consultation among the Judges.”91  “If it be true,” Chase contin-
ued, “that a Judge was selected to prepare the opinion this also must 
have been agreed on in the caucus!”92  Chase wondered how Johnson 
“could . . . have manufactured the story from whole cloth.”93
Finally, Chase reported that after the Court had adjourned in 
early April 1866, Justice Clifford, accompanying Chase on a train to 
New York, had told him that after the Justices had agreed with Grier’s 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Letter from Samuel F. Miller to David Davis ( June 28, 1866) [hereinafter Miller-
Davis Letter], quoted in FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 157 n.95. 
88 Chase-Miller Letter I, supra note 82. 
89 MO. DEMOCRAT, June 22, 1866, reprinted in FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, 
at 156; see also Miller-Davis Letter, supra note 87 (“I gave an emphatic contradiction [of 
the “falsehood” that the case had been decided], as you did . . . .”). 
90 Telegram from Stephen J. Field to Salmon P. Chase ( June 30, 1866), quoted in 
FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 157. 
91 Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Samuel F. Miller ( July 3, 1866) [hereinafter 
Chase-Miller Letter II], quoted in FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 157. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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motion in conference to postpone the test oath cases and were sitting 
in court for the last time before adjournment, Justice Nelson had said 
that Grier was now prepared to withdraw his motion so that the cases 
could be decided.94  Clifford told Chase that he had said to Nelson 
that he regarded the matter as settled and would not agree to reopen-
ing the cases.95  Chase had been unaware of any of this activity.96
The communications on the test oath cases reveal that, at least at 
that point in his career, Chase was hardly a master of the details of the 
Court’s deliberations and had reason to believe that groups of Justices 
may have been caucusing on issues outside his presence.  But it seems 
inconceivable that he could not even recall the Court’s having dis-
cussed the Missouri test oath cases, especially since he had remem-
bered Field’s statement, which indicated that five Justices were pre-
pared to find the Missouri test oath unconstitutional.  The fact was 
that Chase, who supported test oaths, had an incentive to have the 
cases postponed, as did Miller:  over the summer a Justice might 
change his mind or some of the more senior members of the Court 
(Nelson, Wayne, and Grier were each in their seventies) might retire 
or die. 
Chase’s doggedness, and his tendency to engage in sharp practice 
when he felt strongly about issues, was not limited to the test oaths 
episode.  After the conclusion of considerable infighting among the 
Justices over the Legal Tender Cases, in which a newly expanded Court 
reversed a one-year-old decision of its predecessor in concluding that 
greenback notes could constitutionally be made legal tender for the 
payment of debts,97 Miller reported that Chase, who had written the 
Court’s previous opinion finding a federal statute making greenbacks 
legal tender unconstitutional, “ha[d] resorted to all the strategems of 
the lowest political trickery to prevent [new legal tender cases] being 
heard, and the fight has been bitter in the conference room.”98  “The 
excitement,” Miller said, “has nearly used me up.  It has been fearful; 
and my own position as leader in marshalling my forces, and keeping 
up their courage, against a domineering Chief, . . . has been such a 
94 Chase-Miller Letter I, supra note 82. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 110 U.S. 421, 450 (1883). 
98 Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger (Apr. 21, 1870), quoted in 
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER, supra note 77, at 170-71. 
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strain on my brain and nervous system as I never wish to encounter 
again.”99
The above evidence about Chase not only reveals the sort of Chief 
Justice he was, it indicates that by the time of the Chase Court there 
was still no formal protocol for the Court’s deliberations.  As Chase’s 
diary entry indicates, many cases came to the Court on routine mat-
ters, and were disposed of in conference shortly after being argued.  
Others, however, such as the test oath cases or the legal tender cases, 
could, especially where the Justices were divided, occupy the Court for 
several weeks.  Chase undoubtedly had autocratic tendencies, and was 
not loath to resort to “strategems” in the pursuit of outcomes he de-
sired, but there is no evidence that he dominated his Court to the ex-
tent that Marshall, or even Taney, had.  Miller reported, after Chase’s 
death: 
He liked to have his own way:  but when he came upon the bench it was 
admirable to see how quietly and courteously the Court resisted his im-
perious will, never coming to direct conflict, and he finally had to take 
the position which he held, that he was the Moderator and presiding of-
ficer over the Supreme Court, and not possessed of any more authority 
than the rest of the Bench chose to give him.
100
Chase himself had conveyed that view of his office in 1868, but the 
view was not entirely accurate.  By the end of Chase’s tenure in 1873, 
the Court was still sufficiently informal in its deliberative processes 
that a Chief Justice who commanded the intellectual and personal re-
spect of his colleagues had opportunities to exert influence that ex-
ceeded those of his colleagues.  But although Chase had some intel-
lectual abilities and strong political principles, he never succeeded in 
disabusing his fellow Justices of the perception that he was a strong-
willed, sometimes disingenuous partisan.  A more tactful, less strate-
gic, and more conscientious Chief would have been able to dominate 
his Court. 
B.  Assigning Opinions 
Very little evidence has surfaced from the period of Chase’s chief 
justiceship about the Court’s practices in the assignment of opinions.  
Among Chase’s colleagues were some Justices of great ability, such as 
Miller, Field, and Bradley, and Chase did not write the majority of his 
99 Id. 
100 Newspaper Account of Interview with Samuel F. Miller (1878), quoted in FAIR-
MAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 26-27. 
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Court’s most significant opinions.101  Chase’s comments to Miller 
about the test oath cases suggest that he took for granted that if a ma-
jority of Justices existed for the disposition of a case that he did not 
support, the opinion in that case would be assigned by that majority 
(he speculated to Miller that the selection of a Justice to prepare the 
opinion had been “agreed on in the caucus”).102 Chase’s letter does 
not identify Wayne, the senior Justice in that majority, as having made 
the assignment; it suggests that the assignment was a collective deci-
sion.103
On the other hand, Chase’s diary entry of January 7, 1866, makes 
it clear that he was assigning at least some cases.104  When that entry is 
taken together with Chase’s letter to Miller about the test oath cases, it 
suggests that Chase took on assignments when he was with the major-
ity, but when he was not, the process may have been more informal.  
In the sequence of cases testing the constitutionality of the Legal 
Tender Act of 1862, Chase assigned the first opinion to himself, but 
the second opinion was delivered and written by Justice William 
Strong, who had just been appointed to the Court.  The most senior 
Justice in Strong’s majority was Samuel Miller, a strong supporter of 
the legal tender legislation, but there is no evidence that Miller as-
signed the opinion to Strong. 
Although the succession of Morrison Waite to the chief justiceship 
in 1874 (Chase died on May 7, 1873) produced a change in the atti-
tude of the Chief Justice toward assignments, it did not apparently 
produce an alteration in the Court’s assignment protocol.  The Chief 
Justice continued to assign all cases in which he was with the majority, 
but when the Chief dissented, the assignment was made, as it had 
been on the Chase Court, by a caucus of the majority Justices.105
101 If one treats Brenner’s definition of “salient” cases as the equivalent of “signifi-
cant” ones, Chase was with the majority in nine of fourteen such cases during his ten-
ure.  He wrote the opinion of the Court in five such cases.  Brenner associates “salient” 
cases with those listed as “major decisions of the Supreme Court” in CONGRESSIONAL 
QUARTERLY, INC., THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 211-55 (1990).  He assumes that 
when Chief Justices wrote opinions for the Court they had assigned those opinions to 
themselves.  Although this may well have been the case for the Marshall, Taney, and 
Chase Courts, there is no direct evidence confirming the practice.  See Brenner, supra 
note 39, at 145-46. 
102 Chase-Miller Letter II, supra note 91. 
103 Id. 
104 Chase Diary Entry, supra note 40. 
105 For an example, see Chief Justice Waite’s Docket Book from United States v. Lee, 
106 U.S. 196 (1882), in which Waite dissented and noted that the “opinion of the 
Court” had been given to Justice Miller “by assignment of his associates.”  CHARLES 
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In contrast to Chase, Waite was highly interested in being counted 
with the majority in cases he regarded as significant,106 and he also 
seems to have assigned cases with a view toward making as equal a dis-
tribution of assignments as possible, taking into account the varying 
skills of his colleagues.107  The result was that during Waite’s tenure 
the assignment power of the Chief became one of the devices by 
which the occupant of that position attempted to increase his internal 
stature. 
Waite had had a somewhat embarrassing appointment to the chief 
justiceship.  He was not President Grant’s first choice; Grant’s initial 
selection was Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York, a flamboyant fig-
ure who was one of the architects of the “spoils system” of patronage 
to which both major parties subscribed in the years following the Civil 
War.108  After Conkling declined, three sitting Justices—Swayne, 
Miller, and Bradley—campaigned for the position, but Grant decided 
not to appoint someone from the Court.  He then made a fruitless, 
almost comic, series of offers and appointments, offering the chief jus-
ticeship to two Senators; his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish; his At-
torney General, George Williams; and seventy-four-year-old Caleb 
Cushing, a political confederate.  The Senators and Fish turned him 
down; Williams’s name was withdrawn after evidence surfaced that he 
had mingled his personal accounts with those of the Justice Depart-
ment; and Cushing withdrew his name after it became clear that the 
Senate would not confirm him.  A process that had begun over the 
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, PART TWO, at 711 (The Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 7, Paul 
A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1987) [hereinafter FAIRMAN, PART TWO]. 
106 In 1881, the historian George Bancroft asked Waite to list the most prominent 
cases involving constitutional questions that had been decided in his tenure.  Waite 
mentioned seventy-two cases.  In sixty-six of those cases he had voted with the majority.  
Letter from Morrison R. Waite to George Bancroft (May 23, 1881), quoted in C. PETER 
MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE:  THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 263 & n.40 (1963). 
107 In a letter to Field, who had expressed annoyance at David Davis’s having been 
given the opinion in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 91 U.S. 72 (1875), Waite 
said: 
As for opinions in important cases, I don’t know, but I think you fared better 
than the Judge who has the [Union Pacific] case did at the last term.  Certainly 
during the present term he has had no advantage over you.  I certainly intend 
to treat all my brethren fairly in this most delicate and at the same time im-
portant part of my work. 
Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Stephen J. Field (Nov. 10, 1875), quoted in MAGRATH, 
supra note 106, at 259-60. 
108 For accounts of Waite’s appointment, see MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 2-22; 
FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 105, at 5-83. 
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summer of 1873 had yielded no results by January 1874.  Waite at the 
time was serving as counsel for the U.S. government in an arbitration 
proceeding in Geneva.  He had been an Ohio lawyer who had some 
involvement with Republican politics and was known to have an incor-
ruptible reputation.  But he was virtually unknown.  After Grant ap-
pointed him on January 19, The Nation said that the President had 
“avoided choosing any first-rate man,” and that Waite “stands in the 
front rank of second-rate lawyers.”109
Aware of his obscurity, Waite determined to make a good first im-
pression, paying social calls on the Justices after arriving in Washing-
ton before his formal swearing-in and delaying writing an opinion for 
some time after ascending to the bench.  Three weeks into the posi-
tion he wrote his wife, 
Every day in Court hard at work and harder at work outside of the Court 
room.  It is all new and I have adopted the plan of going to the bottom 
of all new questions so that when I once understand it fully, I shall not 
have to look it up again. . . . 
 . . . [W]e had a great many cases submitted to us last week.  I had to 
examine all of them and prepare myself to state intelligently the ques-
tions to be decided. . . . I went to Court with nearly all the cases prepared 
for presentation and Judge Miller and Judge Davis . . . both compli-
mented me on my dispatch of business.  I have as yet read no opinions, 
in Court, and I have prepared none.  When I pass that test successfully I 
shall put myself where I have nothing more to fear, if I keep up to my 
standards.
110
The letter makes clear that the custom of the Chief Justice pre-
senting cases to be discussed at the Court’s conference remained in 
place as Waite succeeded Chase.  It also reveals Waite’s awareness that 
some members of the Court viewed his appointment with skepticism.  
Miller wrote after three weeks that he found Waite “pleasant, a good 
presiding officer,” but “mediocre.”111  Field, writing about the same 
time, said that Waite was “gentlemanly in his manners,” but “how 
much of a lawyer he is remains to be seen,” adding that “[h]e may 
turn out to be a Marshall or a Taney, though such a result is hardly to 
be expected.”112  Mindful of his inexperience and obscure reputation, 
109 NATION, Jan. 22, 1874, quoted in MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 17. 
110 Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Amelia Waite (Mar. 22, 1874), quoted in MA-
GRATH, supra note 106, at 105-06. 
111 Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger (Mar. 21, 1874), quoted in 
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER, supra note 77, at 349. 
112 Letter from Stephen J. Field to Matthew P. Deady (Mar. 16, 1874), quoted in 
MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 107. 
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Waite proceeded cautiously, writing only five opinions in his first 
Term; the other Justices each produced between seventeen and thirty 
opinions in the same time period.113
Once Waite became more comfortable, he took on a large share 
of the Court’s work.  Between 1870 and 1890, the Court’s workload 
increased significantly, largely as a result of the growing number of 
nonconstitutional cases that lower courts certified.  Independent fed-
eral circuit courts of appeal were not established until 1891.114  Waite 
responded to the situation by increasing his own assignments, at one 
point taking over the circuit duties of Justice Ward Hunt after Hunt 
suffered a stroke in 1878.115  He also took on a large number of opin-
ions in cases he considered significant and assigned other opinions to 
his more gifted colleagues, bypassing Justices, such as Clifford, 
Swayne, Davis, and Hunt, who were either disinclined to write opin-
ions or whom Waite thought inept.116
Waite’s administrative skills eventually came to be appreciated by 
Miller, who had continued, throughout the 1870s, to regard Waite as 
undistinguished.  In an 1875 letter, Miller had complained that “I 
can’t make a great Chief Justice out of a small man,” noting that Waite 
was assigning cases to Clifford and Swayne, whose old age and lack of 
competence resulted in their “writ[ing] opinions in which their garru-
lity is often mixed with mischief.”117  He wrote in the same vein four 
years later, stating that Waite lacked the “firmness and courage” to in-
sist that his colleagues write shorter opinions.118  Waite wanted “to be 
popular,” Miller suggested, and had “no conception” of “what is be-
coming” to the Court.119  In 1885, however, when Waite fell ill and 
113 See FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 105, at 131 (noting that Miller wrote thirty 
opinions, Swayne and Strong twenty-seven, Hunt twenty-four, Bradley twenty-three, 
Field twenty-one, Davis nineteen, and Clifford seventeen). 
114 See MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 266-67 (discussing the Supreme Court’s heavy 
workload prior to the establishment of the circuit courts of appeal). 
115 Id. at 268-69. 
116 Between 1874 and 1881, Waite wrote fourteen opinions in constitutional cases 
he considered significant.  He assigned eleven such cases each to Miller and Field, ten 
to Strong, seven to Bradley, and five to Justice John Marshall Harlan, who had joined 
the Court in 1877.  He assigned only four opinions to Swayne, two to Davis, and one 
each to Clifford and Hunt; each of these four Justices was on the Court for the entire 
time period.  MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 263. 
117 Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger (Dec. 5, 1875), quoted in 
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER, supra note 77, at 373-74. 
118 Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger (Oct. 29, 1879), quoted in 
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER, supra note 77, at 408-09. 
119 Id. 
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Miller, now the senior associate Justice, presided in his stead between 
January and March, Miller confessed that although “I always knew that 
he did a great deal more work than I . . . [,] what I suspected hardly 
comes up to the draft on his time as he performed these duties.”120  
On one occasion Miller complained to Waite that Bradley was not 
completing his opinions, saying that if he were “permanent C Justice” 
he would give Bradley no more opinion assignments until the situa-
tion was rectified.121  Miller’s correspondence suggests that he had be-
gun to appreciate some of the additional burdens that went with the 
chief justiceship:  he urged Waite, when he returned, not to work as 
hard lest he break down.122
By Waite’s death in 1888 his colleagues had come to appreciate 
both the importance of administrative skills in the chief justiceship 
and Waite’s own abilities as a manager.  Justice Samuel Blatchford 
captured that assessment in an 1886 letter to Waite in which he de-
clared: 
Your brethren alone, in the intimacy of the conference room, and the 
privacy of the arcana, know the skill, the patience, the uniform good 
temper, and the high sense of the dignity of the Court, which have 
marked the discharge of your duties.
123
During Waite’s tenure it had become clear that the Court’s in-
creased docket had created constant pressure on the Justices to dis-
pose of cases, and that the speedy and effective dispatch of business 
fell primarily on the Chief.  Not only was it important for Chiefs to 
present cases succinctly at conference and to assign opinions so as to 
ensure that they were passed upon and delivered in a timely fashion, 
but Chiefs regularly, as Miller noted in 1885, disposed of “practice 
motions, motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction,” and other sum-
mary matters, all of which involved written instructions to the Court’s 
clerk.124  Waite, whose juristic abilities were clearly overshadowed by 
some of his colleagues’,125 had nonetheless proved to be a distin-
120 Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger ( Jan. 18, 1885) [hereinaf-
ter Miller-Ballinger Letter], quoted in FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER, supra note 77, at 
391. 
121 Letter from Samuel F. Miller to Morrison R. Waite ( Jan. 25, 1885), quoted in 
MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 273. 
122 MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 274. 
123 Letter from Samuel Blatchford to Morrison R. Waite (Nov. 29, 1886), quoted in 
MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 275. 
124 Miller-Ballinger Letter, supra note 120. 
125 Waite seemed aware of his limitations as a jurist.  He wrote to Field on one oc-
casion:  “The difficulty with me is that I cannot give the reasons as I wish I could.”  Let-
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guished managerial Chief at a time when managerial skills had clearly 
become part of the job description of the Chief Justice. 
C.  From Waite to Fuller:  The Chief Justice as Manager 
The process by which Melville Weston Fuller succeeded to the 
chief justiceship after Waite’s death in 1888 resembled that of Waite’s 
nomination in that the designee was a comparative nonentity.  When 
Fuller was appointed, the New York Herald commented that he was “so 
unknown that his page did not appear in the latest standard works of 
contemporary biography,” and the Philadelphia Press suggested that 
“he was the most obscure man ever appointed Chief Justice.”126  No 
previous nominee had had such little experience in state or federal 
governmental positions.  Fuller’s only public service had been a two-
year stint in the Illinois legislature, where he had unfortunately 
aligned himself with the antiwar faction of the Democratic Party, 
which was humiliated in the 1864 election.127  He was appointed be-
cause he was a friend of President Grover Cleveland, from Illinois (the 
only major state without representation on the Court at the time), and 
shared Cleveland’s views on currency issues.128  He was reluctant to ac-
cept the position and did so primarily because he did not want to em-
barrass Cleveland.129
Like Waite, Fuller was aware of the talents of some of the mem-
bers of the Court that he joined, and was aware that not all of them 
expected great things from him.  Two years after his appointment he 
wrote to the Court’s reporter that “with these old luminaries blazing 
away with all their ancient fires” there would be “[n]o rising sun for 
me” as an incoming Chief.130  But Fuller’s relations with the four 
dominant Justices he confronted on coming to the Court—Miller, 
Field, Bradley, and Harlan—were excellent.  Bradley, who on Fuller’s 
ter from Morrison R. Waite to Stephen J. Field (Apr. 28, 1882), quoted in MAGRATH, 
supra note 106, at 185.  He wrote to Justice Gray on another:  “Can’t you tell me the 
secret of your style.  I wish I had it.”  Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Horace Gray 
(Feb. 21, 1884), quoted in MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 185. 
126 WILLARD L. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER:  CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1888-1910, at 114 (1950). 
127 See id. at 54 (calling Fuller’s time in the Illinois House “the greatest misfortune 
of his career”); see also id. at 115 (presenting a table of previous governmental posts 
held by Chief Justices from Jay through Vinson). 
128 Id. at 105-08. 
129 Id. at 108-13. 
130 Letter from Melville W. Fuller to Bancroft Davis ( Jan. 18, 1890), quoted in JAMES 
W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 25 (1995). 
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nomination had suggested that only a “happy accident” would make 
Fuller’s appointment “admirable,”131 responded warmly to Fuller’s 
seeking his advice.132  Miller, who died only two years after Fuller be-
came Chief Justice, had by that time concluded that “Fuller was the 
best presiding judge that the Supreme Court had had within his time” 
and that “he was a most lovable, congenial man.”133  Field, who from 
the early 1890s until his forced retirement in 1897 was increasingly er-
ratic and irascible, was sufficiently won over by Fuller that he gave 
Fuller his proxy when Field had a brief illness in 1893.134  And Harlan, 
whom Fuller had disparaged on his appointment to the Court in 1877, 
became a close friend of the Chief Justice.135
None of those reactions to Fuller was based on his intellectual 
contributions to the Court.  It became clear to Fuller’s associates that 
although he was as interested as Waite in the efficient dispatch of 
Court business,136 and as prepared as Waite to take on a good per-
centage of the Court’s opinions,137 he was a diffident and not alto-
131 Letter from Joseph P. Bradley to Stephen J. Field (n.d.), quoted in Irving 
Schiffman, Melville W. Fuller, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT:  THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 715, 724 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel 
eds., 1995). 
132 See KING, supra note 126, at 131 (“Fuller won Bradley by asking his aid . . . . 
Bradley took the new Chief Justice under his care and constantly counseled him.  
Fuller was closer to Bradley than to any other Justice during the three years of their 
joint service.”). 
133 Miller made this comment to Senator Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois.  SHELBY M. 
CULLOM, FIFTY YEARS OF PUBLIC SERVICE 241 (2d ed. 1911). 
134 See Letter from Stephen J. Field to Melville W. Fuller (Dec. 16, 1893), quoted in 
ELY, supra note 130, at 26-27 (“You can cast my vote in all the cases with your 
own . . . .”). 
135 See KING, supra note 126, at 132 (“Although Fuller had opposed Harlan’s con-
firmation, they had become great friends by the time of Fuller’s appointment.”). 
136 Fuller was greatly advantaged in that regard by the passage of the Circuit Court 
of Appeals (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, which created intermediate fed-
eral circuit courts of appeal and eliminated direct appeals to the Supreme Court from 
most decisions of the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases.  The result was a 
dramatic reduction in the Fuller Court’s docket.  In 1888 the Court had 1571 cases on 
its docket, in 1889, 1648, and in 1890, 1816.  KING, supra note 126, at 148.  Even in its 
most active Terms the Court could not dispose of more than 450 cases per year.  Id.  
Although the resultant backlog of cases was not to be eliminated for several years, by 
the turn of the twentieth century, the backlog had been reduced from approximately 
1100 to 300 cases a year.  ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE:  LEADERSHIP AND THE SU-
PREME COURT 135 (1986).  In addition, after the passage of the Evarts Act the Court 
heard fewer new cases.  KING, supra note 126, at 151.  In 1890 there were 623 new cases 
on its docket, in 1891, 383, and in 1892, 290.  Id.  For a slightly different count of cases, 
see ELY, supra note 130, at 42-43. 
137 Fuller wrote 840 majority opinions during his tenure (1888-1910).  ELY, supra 
note 130, at 36.  From 1888 through 1901, he wrote more opinions than any other Jus-
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gether successful opinion writer.  One student of the Fuller Court 
called his prose style “verbose and diffuse,” noting that “[h]is opinions 
were clogged with excessive quotations from other decisions” and that 
“[h]e rarely turned a . . . memorable phrase.”138  Another commenta-
tor stated that Fuller “was respected by his colleagues, but only for his 
personal qualities and his administrative competence, not his legal 
acuity or depth.”139  Fuller “was not in any way the source of the ideas 
that gave [his] Court its place in history.”140
The same commentator, on noting that Fuller assigned himself 
comparatively few of the major opinions handed down during his 
tenure,141 suggested that there was “a very good reason” for his prac-
tice.142  “The issue,” he felt, “was not simply one of rhetorical style, ele-
gance, vividness, or clarity of exposition, though his opinions lacked 
these qualities.”143  It was “instead one of logical structure.  [Fuller’s] 
writings suggest that he was not fully in command of the central ideas 
that so characterized the time.  Fuller was in no position to lead” his 
Court.144
But it was clear that Fuller did lead his Court in another respect.  
As Holmes later put it, Fuller “had the business of the Court at his fin-
gers[’] ends, he was perfectly courageous, prompt, decided.  He 
turned off the matters that daily called for action easily, swiftly, with 
the least possible friction.”145  Fuller was also consistently tactful with 
his colleagues.  Holmes told the story of interrupting an argument ad-
vanced by Harlan in conference one day by declaring, “[T]hat just 
tice.  KING, supra note 126, app. I at 339.  After Oliver Wendell Holmes joined the 
Court in 1902 Fuller’s output receded, but only in his last three Terms, when Fuller’s 
health began to decline, was there a noticeable falloff.  ELY, supra note 130, at 37.  For 
additional evidence of this decline, see the table of Fuller Court opinions in KING, su-
pra note 126, app. I at 339. 
138 ELY, supra note 130, at 37. 
139 OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 26-
27 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, vol. 8, Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993). 
140 Id. at 27. 
141 For evidence of Fuller’s disinclination to assign himself opinions of the Court 
in important cases, see Brenner, supra note 39, at 146 (concluding that although Fuller 
was with the majority in twenty-seven out of thirty-five such cases, he assigned the opin-
ion of the Court to himself in only four of them, the lowest percentage of all the 
Chiefs). 
142 FISS, supra note 139, at 28. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William L. Putnam ( July 12, 1910), 
quoted in KING, supra note 126, at 334. 
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won’t wash,” Harlan taking umbrage, and Fuller interjecting, “But I 
just keep scrubbing away” to defuse the tension.146  A study of “leader-
ship” among Chief Justices found that Fuller did 
what a successful manager must do:  pay attention to matters large and 
small.  In the latter he cultivated friendship by looking to the welfare of 
each justice, inviting new appointments to a special dinner, deferring 
frequently to the opinion of others, and originating the custom of re-
quiring each justice to greet and shake hands with every other justice be-
fore they began the day . . . . [He also] carr[ied] the heavy burden of 
writing more than his share of opinions . . . .
147
Fuller’s skills extended to the assignment of opinions:  Holmes 
wrote a judicial colleague in 1930 that “his grounds were not always 
obvious, but I know how serious and solid they were and how remote 
was any partiality from his choice.”148  “As a presiding officer,” Holmes 
told Felix Frankfurter, “Fuller was the greatest Chief Justice I have 
ever known.”149
The managerial functions of the Chief Justice at the close of the 
nineteenth century continued to take place against a backdrop in 
which the Court’s protocols remained strikingly informal.  Through 
Fuller’s tenure the Justices continued the practice of not circulating 
assigned opinions before they were read in conference prior to being 
announced in Court.  Only in exceptional cases—those perceived as 
having widespread public implications and provoking division within 
the Court—did the Justices depart from this practice.150
The Court’s practices with respect to the assignment of opinions 
were equally informal.  As we have seen, during the Chase and Waite 
146 KING, supra note 126, at 290. 
147 STEAMER, supra note 136, at 134. 
148 Letter (draft) from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Stephen A. Day (1930), quoted in 
KING, supra note 126, at 334. 
149 KING, supra note 126, at 290. 
150 For a rare example from the Waite Court where draft opinions were circulated 
as part of the Justices’ deliberations, see FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 105, at 365; 
MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 182.  The case in question was Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
135 (1877), which involved the constitutionality of legislation regulating grain eleva-
tors. 
 The usual practice of noncirculation was in place for the opinion in Railroad Co. v. 
Fort, 84 U.S. 553 (1874).  The decision was announced on January 5, 1874, and Justice 
Miller wrote his brother-in-law almost two weeks later that he “received yesterday for 
the first time the opinion in the case,” and that he was surprised to see that the author 
of the opinion, Justice David Davis, had decided the case on its facts, and therefore, in 
Miller’s view, the opinion “can be of little value to any one.”  Letter from Samuel F. 
Miller to William P. Ballinger (Jan. 18, 1874), quoted in FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 
105, at 104-05. 
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Courts the Chief Justice apparently assigned opinions when he was in 
the majority, but when he was among the dissenters the opinion was 
assigned by a caucus of the majority Justices.  Fuller clearly assigned 
opinions when he was in the majority as well,151 but there is also evi-
dence that on occasion he assigned opinions when he had dis-
sented.152
In sum, the nineteenth-century legacy of the Chief Justice’s inter-
nal powers revealed those powers to be considerable.  As the Court 
evolved from one in which the distribution of opinion assignments 
was uneven to one in which Justices had an expectation of sharing 
equally in the writing of opinions, the Chief’s role in opinion assign-
ments became a more delicate one.  Part of Waite’s and Fuller’s suc-
cess with their colleagues came from the tactful manner in which they 
met expectations while preserving their goal of ensuring that dilatory 
or less competent Justices received fewer assignments.  In addition, as 
the Court’s docket increased, the Chief’s role in managing that 
docket, which included setting the agenda for conferences and dispos-
ing of the Court’s more summary actions, took on a greater impor-
tance.  By Waite’s tenure, the Court’s “adjourned Term” had become 
a permanent feature of its calendar, so that the Justices met in Wash-
ington from October through May, with circuit riding reserved for the 
summer months.  After 1891, the Justices’ circuit-riding obligations 
ceased, and the presence of the federal circuit courts of appeal re-
duced the volume of the Court’s business, but Chiefs continued to be 
faced with backlogs of cases.  For all of Waite’s tenure, and all but the 
151 See, e.g., Letter from Stephen J. Field to Melville W. Fuller (Mar. 8, 1896), quoted 
in KING, supra note 126, at 224 (“I return to you the enclosed memorandum of the 
cases assigned to the different Justices made yesterday.  I do not care to retain any 
memorandum of assignment of cases where none are assigned to myself.  I do not 
know and shall not ask the reason that no cases have been assigned to me within the 
past six months.”).  Field had been failing in the mid-1890s, although he was deter-
mined to stay on the Court, and Fuller had assigned him fewer and fewer cases.  KING, 
supra note 126, at 222-24. 
152 On May 19, 1910, Fuller wrote a letter to Holmes asking him to take over the 
writing of an opinion previously assigned to Justice David Brewer, who had died soon 
after the assignment.  “I am compelled to ask you if you can write this case,” Fuller 
said.  “The vote was Lurton & C.J. to affirm & Day, Holmes, McKenna, White, Brewer 
and Harlan to reverse.”  Letter from Melville W. Fuller to Oliver Wendell Holmes (May 
19, 1910), quoted in FISS, supra note 139, at 23 n.6.  The case was Dozier v. Alabama, 218 
U.S. 124 (1910).  When Holmes produced his opinion, the dissenters declined to file 
published opinions.  Had current practice been followed, the assignment of the Dozier 
opinion would have fallen to Justice Harlan, the senior Justice in the majority. 
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last years of Fuller’s, this resulted in the Chief Justice taking on the 
largest number of opinions.153
The managerial powers of the Chief were accentuated by the fact 
that the Court’s deliberative process remained comparatively informal 
throughout Fuller’s tenure.  Once opinion assignments were made—
typically by the Chief, given Waite’s and Fuller’s pattern of infre-
quently dissenting—opinions were not circulated, except on rare oc-
casions, before being read by the author in conference.  This gave 
opinion writers considerable autonomy with their language and 
meant that writing an opinion was a greater opportunity to shape its 
impact than under a system in which drafts were circulated, and lan-
guage potentially altered, in order to keep majorities intact.  As a re-
sult, opinion assignments may have been more coveted than under 
the Court’s current protocol.  The correspondence about opinion as-
signments that has survived from the Waite and Fuller Courts suggests 
that Justices passed over in assignments were disappointed and that 
Chiefs took pains to create an impression of being fair-minded in 
their assignment decisions. 
The comparative obscurity of Waite and Fuller at the time of their 
nominations, when added to the fact that each of them joined Courts 
featuring experienced senior Justices who were accustomed to exert-
ing influence, may have contributed to the attention they paid to the 
managerial dimensions of their positions.  At the same time, both 
Waite and Fuller, comparatively self-effacing individuals with strong 
personal relations skills, may have gravitated to the managerial aspects 
of the chief justiceship.  One might compare the tactful responses of 
Waite to piqued outbursts by Field,154 or Fuller’s mild suppression of 
153 On the length of the Court’s Terms, see FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 40, at 
69 n.138 (indicating that between 1859 and 1867 the Court began its Terms in De-
cember, and that its average Term lasted about seventeen weeks, extending into 
April).  In the 1868 Term, when Chase was in the fourth year of his chief justiceship, 
the Court began its “adjourned Term” practice, which consisted of taking up cases in 
October that had not been decided the preceding spring.  Those “adjourned Term” 
sessions would continue until 1873, when Congress enacted a statute changing the of-
ficial date of the Court’s opening from December to “the second Monday of October.”  
Act of Jan. 24, 1873, ch. 64, 17 Stat. 419.  During Waite’s tenure, the sessions that be-
gan in October typically lasted through the first half of May.  FAIRMAN, PART ONE, su-
pra note 40, at 69 n.138. 
 For a discussion of the Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 
Stat. 826, which ended the obligation of the Justices to ride circuit but did not have an 
appreciable effect on the Court’s docket, see FISS, supra note 139, at 24-25. 
154 See MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 260 (reprinting and discussing Waite’s letters 
to Field after Field had protested against not receiving an opinion assignment in United 
States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 91 U.S. 72 (1875)).  Field had apparently taken of-
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Holmes’s instinct to write every opinion he could,155 with the covert 
strategic behavior that characterized Chase’s approach to internal is-
sues during his tenure.  By 1910 it had become clear that for a Chief 
to be internally effective, he needed to “manage” his colleagues. 
Meanwhile, the norm of silent acquiescence seems to have re-
mained in place, although its impact was reduced, especially under 
Waite’s and Fuller’s tenures, as Chiefs became more concerned with 
equalizing opportunities for their colleagues to write “opinions of the 
Court,” especially in significant cases.  The comparatively small 
amount of correspondence between Waite and Fuller and their col-
leagues about opinion assignments suggests that unless a Justice was 
aged or infirm, writing opinions for the Court was valued, and that is-
suing public dissents was less frowned upon than it had been during 
Marshall’s tenure.  It seems fair to say that although silent acquies-
cence continued to take place on the Court as it entered the twentieth 
century, the supposition that it functioned to enable “lazy, modest, 
and incompetent” Justices to avoid having to do much work was less 
credible than it may have been on the Marshall Court. 
III.  TRANSFORMED PROTOCOLS AND THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP 
The managerial dimensions of the chief justiceship have remained 
in place throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  But the 
backdrop of the Court’s business has undergone very significant 
changes since Fuller’s time.  The changes have been so radical, in fact, 
that Justices who served on the Fuller Court might have difficulty rec-
ognizing its twenty-first century institutional counterpart. 
fense at Waite’s suggestion that it made sense to assign the opinion to Davis, who was 
known as a critic of the railroad industry.  In the second of the letters, Waite reminded 
Field that “[t]here was no doubt of your intimate personal relations with the managers 
of the Central Pacific,” and “that you were dissatisfied with the manner of the argu-
ment on the part of the government,” a sentiment which “might, unconsciously to you, 
find expression in the opinion.”  Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Stephen J. Field 
(Nov. 10, 1875), quoted in MAGRATH, supra note 106, at 260.  Waite also noted that “[a]s 
for opinions in important cases, . . . I think you fared better than [Davis] . . . did at the 
last term.”  Id. 
155 See Letter from Melville W. Fuller to Mary Ellen Coolbaugh Fuller (Feb. 18, 
1903), quoted in KING, supra note 126, at 291 (“The Nimble Holmes has got out his 
last—I delayed his progress for about a week but he deserved the obstacle & is free and 
clear & I suppose eager for more work.”).  Earlier Holmes had written to Fuller, “I am 
on my last [assigned] cases barring the one you told me not to write until further no-
tice . . . .”  Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Melville W. Fuller (Feb. 5, 1903), 
quoted in KING, supra note 126, at 291. 
  
2006] THE INTERNAL POWERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1503 
 
The present Court sits in its own building, with chambers for indi-
vidual Justices, rather than in a room in the Capitol.  Conferences are 
held in a room in the Court, rather than in a boardinghouse, a Capi-
tol consultation room, or, as during Fuller’s tenure, in the Chief Jus-
tice’s house in Washington.156  Instead of doing most of their work in 
their homes and coming together only for oral arguments and con-
ferences, Justices now have the opportunity to see their colleagues on 
a daily basis outside of the courtroom or conference room.  Although 
not all take advantage of the opportunities for informal contact and 
exchange of ideas that their work environment offers, such opportu-
nities do exist.  One might say that the present Court’s work environ-
ment more closely resembles that of the Marshall Court than the 
Courts on which Waite, Fuller, and their contemporaries served. 
The opportunities afforded to Justices for a protracted exchange 
of ideas are matched in the current Court by the incentives for ex-
change that have been produced by its transformed protocols.  The 
internal deliberative process of the current Court is substantially dif-
ferent, in a few respects, from that of nineteenth-century Courts.  It is, 
simultaneously, a more formalized and a more collegial process.  The 
transformations in that process—the protocol changes—since the 
nineteenth century have had a discernible effect on the internal pow-
ers of the Chief Justice.  Nonetheless, those powers remain in place, 
making the nineteenth-century legacy of the chief justiceship still 
relevant. 
Two protocol changes have been particularly significant.  One is 
the virtual disappearance of the practice of silent acquiescence.  Al-
though that practice had lessened in significance once Chiefs such as 
Waite and Fuller adopted a more even-handed approach to the as-
signment of opinions, it was still possible, as late as the 1930s, for a 
Justice to have dissented from an opinion of the Court but not re-
corded that dissent.  As late as the 1940s, the official United States Re-
ports only identified the author of the “opinion of the Court” and 
those Justices who either filed concurring or dissenting opinions or 
who had themselves identified as either concurring in the majority re-
sult or dissenting.  The current practice of listing the votes of all the 
Justices who participated in a case in the headnote to that case in the 
156
 ELY, supra note 130, at 39; KING, supra note 126, at 152. 
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United States Reports did not begin until 1947.157  With the adoption of 
that protocol, silent acquiescence became a rare phenomenon.158
The publication of all the votes of the Justices in all cases was ac-
companied by another, equally significant, protocol change.  Instead 
of “opinions of the Court” being assigned, prepared, and ultimately 
delivered without circulation, the circulation of drafts of all “opinions 
of the Court” became, in effect, mandatory.159  This change was not 
contemporaneous with the publication of votes; it seems to have been 
in place, perhaps in an incomplete version, during Holmes’s and 
Brandeis’s tenures on the Court.  A letter Holmes wrote to Fuller in 
1902, shortly after Holmes came on the Court, indicates that Holmes 
had an expectation that his “opinion of the Court” in the case of Otis 
v. Parker160 needed to be passed upon by all the Justices who were 
members of the majority in that case.161  But that was not the practice 
on the Fuller Court:  Justices who were assigned “opinions of the 
Court” continued to prepare them on their own for delivery in con-
ference.  By the White Court, however, there is evidence that drafts of 
157 Technically, the United States Reports did not even begin listing Justices’ posi-
tions that year.  The first example of a listing of all of the Justices’ votes in a headnote 
to a case appears in the first series of the ninety-second volume of the United States Su-
preme Court Reports, Lawyers’ Edition.  The case involved was Rodgers v. United States, 332 
U.S. 371, 92 L. Ed. 3 (1947).  The votes of individual Justices were not listed in the offi-
cial United States Reports headnote for the Rodgers case. 
158 A version of silent acquiescence can still occur where a Justice has prepared a 
dissenting opinion and then is persuaded, or chooses for strategic reasons, to withdraw 
it.  See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 
(1957), for a number of examples of dissenting opinions that Brandeis suppressed, 
typically in exchange for language alterations in the majority opinion.  Brandeis was 
able to do this with greater freedom under the Court’s pre-1947 protocol (Brandeis 
retired from the Court in 1939) since, unless he was recorded as dissenting, his indi-
vidual vote would not be made public.  But even after 1947, a Justice can agree to join 
a majority opinion after having originally dissented, once he becomes satisfied with the 
opinion’s language. 
159 I am including the qualifier “in effect” because there is no formal rule of the 
Court that opinions must be circulated before being formally issued, and circum-
stances such as the sudden illness or incapacitation of a Justice, or of the immediacy of 
particular decision (reportedly not all of the opinions in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000), were circulated among all of the Justices) might result in not all Justices having 
access to opinions.  But there is clearly an expectation that in ordinary circumstances 
all Justices will have access to all opinions that may eventually be published. 
160 187 U.S. 606 (1903). 
161 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Melville W. Fuller (Dec. 28, 1902), 
quoted in KING, supra note 126, at 289 (“I have not heard from Harlan, Brewer, Shiras 
or Peckham J J as to . . . Otis v. Parker.  I suppose I am to do nothing until the next 
conference?  Mr. J. Harlan to be sure said on the day that he received it that he had 
read it and I understood him to agree . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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majority opinions were beginning to be circulated. Holmes com-
plained in letters written in 1918 and 1920 that “the boys” were forc-
ing him to tone down some of his vivid language.162  White sent 
Brandeis a comment on the latter’s first opinion in 1916:  “Very well 
done.  Indeed fine!”163  But circulation was not mandatory, and when it 
occurred it sometimes had the effect of dissolving majorities that had 
existed at conference.164
If the practice of circulating drafts was still informal and occa-
sional before 1947,165 the protocol identifying the votes of all the Jus-
tices in all cases made it mandatory.  Now all Justices who had joined 
an opinion of the Court were known:  the language of that opinion 
was language they had subscribed to.  In such circumstances it was in-
evitable that Justices would want to see the language of draft majority 
opinions before “signing on.” The papers of Justices who served after 
1947 are now filled with notations from colleagues indicating their as-
sent to particular drafts, as well as memoranda raising questions and 
asking for changes. 
162 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock ( Jan. 24, 1918), in 
1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS:  THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR 
FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 257, 258 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) (“The 
boys . . . have badly cut down this week’s [opinion].”); Letter from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Nov. 17, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS:  THE CORRE-
SPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 290, 291 (Mark DeWolfe 
Howe ed., 1953) (“The boys made me emasculate one [opinion] . . . .”). 
163 Letter from Edward D. White to Louis D. Brandeis (n.d.), quoted in ALEXANDER 
M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 
1910-21, at 604 n.167 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, vol. 9, Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1984). 
164 One example was the Arizona Employers’ Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919), 
which tested the constitutionality of an Arizona statute giving workers in hazardous 
occupations, who were covered by workmen’s compensation, the option of seeking 
jury trials for their injuries under the statute, which provided for liability without fault 
on the part of the employer.  After Holmes was initially assigned the opinion by White, 
he produced a draft opinion that generated four dissents, including one from White, 
and was eventually withdrawn for an opinion written by Justice Mahlon Pitney from 
which the same four Justices dissented.  BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 163, at 586-91. 
165 Holmes’s correspondence suggests that by the Taft Court (1921-1930), circula-
tion of draft majority opinions was anticipated.  See, e.g., Letter from Justice Holmes to 
Frederick Pollock (Nov. 26, 1922), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 162, at 
106, 106 (indicating that “everybody [on the Court] seems to have misgivings” about a 
draft opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), that he had cir-
culated).  In addition, STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS:  AN IN-
TELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 242-45 (1994), lists several cases in 
the 1920s in which Brandeis changed his position on cases after the Justices decided to 
abandon previously circulated “opinions of the Court.”  Baskerville relies on material 
in BICKEL, supra note 158, and Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 
1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 309, for his case examples. 
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The implications of these two protocol changes for the work of 
Justices have been quite significant.  Whereas an assignment to write 
the “opinion of the Court” had been, alternately, a plum that a Justice 
coveted or the equivalent of forced labor, that assignment is now an 
exercise in keeping a majority together.  The expectation that “opin-
ions of the Court” would be circulated has meant that Chiefs, on as-
signing them, invariably need to consider the ability of the writer to 
retain that majority.  There is thus an added dimension to the task of 
assigning opinions. 
The new protocol also invited concurring and dissenting opin-
ions.  It confronted all the Justices, in every case, with justifications for 
a result that, on closer inspection, others might not agree with.  Pub-
lished dissents on the Waite and Fuller Courts had been low, and this 
tendency continued on the White Court.  But by the Hughes and 
Stone Courts dissents were becoming more frequent, and by the 1980s 
dissents and concurrences had become so common that a group of 
political scientists attempted to analyze the “mysterious demise of con-
sensual norms” on the Court.166  Despite that effort, it seems unlikely 
that more recent Courts have been less “consensual” than their 
predecessors.  The transformation of protocols, which has ensured 
that all the votes of the Justices will be known and all majority opin-
ions will be circulated in draft form, has created much stronger incen-
tives for Justices to scrutinize language in opinions with which they are 
now publicly associated, and thus more incentives to respond to that 
language in separate opinions.  In addition, whereas Justices as late as 
on the Vinson Court typically had only one law clerk to aid them with 
their research, law clerks have proliferated since Warren’s tenure.  
When one adds computers to the mix, the production of a concurring 
or dissenting opinion in response to a circulated draft becomes a 
comparatively routine part of a Justice’s job description. 
Do these changes make a difference for Chief Justices?  Have they 
served to render the nineteenth-century legacy of the Chief Justice’s 
internal powers irrelevant?  The short answer, despite the altered in-
stitutional context in which the current Court makes decisions, is no.  
The special seniority of the Chief remains, in the form of docket man-
agement powers, conference presiding powers, and assignment pow-
ers.  The assignment of opinions has different implications now that 
the Court’s protocols have changed from an informal “mooting” of 
166 Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the 
United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 (1988). 
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cases, a norm of silent acquiescence, and no circulation of opinions 
prior to delivery to a more formal, routinized conference deliberation 
in which cases are discussed—and opinion assignments given out—on 
the basis of the seniority principle, and in which there is a clear expec-
tation that draft majority opinions will be circulated to all the Justices.  
But the Chief’s assignment power has, if anything, become more chal-
lenging and more important. 
The protocol changes may have subtly affected the managerial 
skills associated with effectiveness as Chief Justice.  In a deliberative 
process in which everyone takes responsibility for their votes, opinion 
writing, because of its collegial dimensions, becomes more burden-
some, and even-handedness in the assignment of opinions conse-
quently becomes more important.  Chiefs now need to balance a sen-
sitivity to varying talents and the symbolic aspects of assigning 
particular Justices to write in particular cases, factors Waite and Fuller 
felt they needed to consider, against a general expectation that opin-
ion assignments will be equally distributed.  In short, the Court’s cur-
rent protocols make opinion assignment a more delicate, and argua-
bly a more important, power than it was for most of the Court’s 
history. 
In addition, the background of the Court’s conferences has 
changed with the understandings among all participants that they will 
be held publicly accountable for votes, and that the conference votes, 
given the circulation protocol, are necessarily tentative.  It is not clear, 
in the tenures of early nineteenth-century Chief Justices, how much 
skill in the presentation of cases scheduled for disposition at a particu-
lar conference mattered; it is not even clear that in the Marshall and 
Taney Courts there were definite sessions reserved for the disposition 
of cases, as opposed to an on-going caucus.  But at least since Waite’s 
tenure, the Chief’s ability to present cases clearly and succinctly, and 
to foster an efficient dispatch of business, has been valued.  Some 
Chiefs—White and Stone were singled out among the twentieth-
century Chief Justices—have tended toward loquacity and disorganiza-
tion in the management of conferences.  Charles Evans Hughes once 
said that “any virtues” he might have had as a Chief Justice “were due 
to my determination to avoid White’s faults.”167  “Very often,” Hughes 
recalled, White “could not make up his mind and a favorite expres-
sion of his was, ‘God help us.’ . . . [A]t times he would deliver an ex-
167 Felix Frankfurter, Diary Entry (Apr. 25, 1947), in FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX 
FRANKFURTER 313-14 ( Joseph P. Lash ed., 1975) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes). 
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temporaneous of oration of an hour’s length” and “I would come 
home from Conference . . . with a strong feeling of frustration.”168  
Stone, who had served as an Associate Justice under Hughes, chafed at 
the dictatorially efficient way in which Hughes ran conferences, and 
when he succeeded Hughes as Chief Justice in 1941 he tried “to focus 
discussion . . . without being too much of a Czar.”169  The result, for 
the course of Stone’s tenure, was very long conferences, a backlog of 
cases, and a proliferation of concurring and dissenting opinions. 
In an atmosphere in which most Chiefs seek to foster consensus 
and the appearance of internal harmony against the backdrop of insti-
tutional changes that encourage Justices to scrutinize their colleagues’ 
opinions carefully and to express themselves individually whenever 
they find themselves unsatisfied with a collegial product, getting the 
Court’s business done without undue division, rancor, or delay takes 
on a high value, and the achievement of that goal largely falls on the 
Chief. 
Finally, the protocol changes have an important jurisprudential 
dimension that has implications for the role of the Chief Justice itself.  
When one considers the silent acquiescence and noncirculation pro-
tocols against the backdrop of a jurisprudentially diminished status for 
judicial opinions, the individualized character of an “opinion of the 
Court”—itself a product, in part, of those protocols—becomes less of 
a deviation than it might appear from the principle that judicial opin-
ions should reflect, rather than create, law.  If an “opinion of the 
Court,” regardless of the number of years in which it has been in 
place, is always susceptible to being shown as “demonstrably errone-
ous,” and thus without any precedential weight, it would seem to mat-
ter less whether the opinion is the considered judgment of nine Jus-
tices or the product of just one.  In this jurisprudential context, the 
deviationist quality of one-judge “opinions of the Court,” not circu-
lated to colleagues, whose dispositions are silently acquiesced in by 
Justices who did not vote for them, can be seen as a product of a quite 
different theory of the role of a judge.  An “opinion of the Court” 
whose reasoning is the product of only one Justice seems obviously 
deviationist if judicial interpretation is equated with lawmaking, and the 
role of a judge is not so much to discern and apply a finite body of le-
gal principles as to persuade others that his particular application of 
168 Id. 
169 Letter from Harlan F. Stone to D. Lawrence Groner (Aug. 17, 1941), quoted in 
PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 259 (1973). 
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legal sources to resolve a controversy is faithful to those sources, ana-
lytically cogent under conventional professional standards, and cul-
turally resonant.  Put another way, the assumption that “law” cannot 
be thought of as wholly independent of the opinions of judges creates 
burdens on judicial opinion writers that an older assumption, re-
flected in the proposition that judicial opinions were merely evidence 
of the law, does not. 
Given the burdens of persuasion that a modernist jurisprudential 
theory of the judge’s role imposes on judicial opinion writers, one 
would expect commentators on a Court’s work product to pay greater 
attention to the reasoning of opinions, and thus to be more mindful 
of the extent to which that reasoning was endorsed by individual 
members of the Court.  One would expect specialist observers of the 
Court’s opinions to be interested in just how each Justice voted in a 
case, and whether a Justice joined an opinion of the Court or wrote 
separately, because that information signals whether a Justice has sub-
scribed to the Court’s reasoning.  With this expectation in place, silent 
acquiescence becomes unpalatable, and the Court’s own headnotes to 
its opinions have now eradicated the practice.  Further, circulation of 
opinions becomes imperative, because an “opinion of the Court” is no 
longer taken to be mere evidence of the law, but, notwithstanding its 
status as a judicial gloss, the practical equivalent of “the law” govern-
ing a particular set of issues. 
In short, once the idea that judges are a species of lawmakers, and 
their interpretations more like the functional equivalent of “the law” 
rather than mere evidence of it, evolved to a position of orthodoxy in 
American jurisprudence, it was inevitable that the Court’s protocols of 
silent acquiescence and noncirculation would be replaced by full dis-
closure of all the Justices’ votes in all cases and mandatory circulation 
of drafts of “opinions of the Court.”  This means that since the 1950s, 
Chief Justices have exercised their agenda-setting and assignment 
powers knowing that whatever the outcome of dispositional votes in 
conference, those votes are necessarily tentative, because every mem-
ber of the Court will typically be required to sign on to one set of justi-
fications for a disposition.170  The protocol changes, in sum, have cre-
170 It is of course possible for a Justice to dissent, or more rarely to concur, without 
opinion, or to indicate that he does not join a portion of an “opinion of the Court.”  
But that practice, at least when unaccompanied by any opinion of the Justice, is in-
creasingly rare.  I would hypothesize that if one were to chart the prevalence of “silent” 
dissents, they would be far more common before the Court’s headnotes began to iden-
tify the votes of all the Justices participating in decisions. 
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ated a whole new dimension to the disposition of cases and the as-
signment of opinions, and no member of the Court is in a better posi-
tion to affect those matters than the Chief Justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The more one studies the evolution of the informal powers of the 
chief justiceship and considers the changing institutional setting in 
which those powers have been exercised, the more one senses that the 
Chief Justice is hardly just first among equals. The modern Chief, like 
his predecessors, has needed to be part facilitator and part autocrat, 
reminding colleagues that fostering the Court’s reputation regularly 
involves the suppression of egos without being unduly overbearing in 
the process.  But unlike most of his predecessors, he has had to deal 
with a process of collegial decision making which has enhanced trans-
parency, and hence enhanced scrutiny and potential vulnerability, for 
its participants.  The more one learns about the internal powers of the 
chief justiceship, the more one realizes that with that office comes 
greater opportunities to exert influence, and to fail to do so, than with 
the Court’s other eight positions. 
 
